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THE FOOTNOTE
J. M. Balkin*
He raises the poor from the dust,
and lifts the needy from the ash heap,
To seat them with princes,
the princes of his people.
-Psalms 113:7-8
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE FOOTNOTE
4I would have liked to have written an essay about the relationship
of law to literature-to deconstruct the opposition between them and, in
the process, to say a few words about deconstructive techniques in gen-
eral. I would have explained that legal writing and literary writing share
a common textuality, a semiotic similarity that one could exploit in legal
as well as literary contexts. I would have pointed out that the seemingly
meaningless and accidental features of a text possess an economy or logic
that both troubles and elucidates other features of the text. I would have
shown how the processes of signification that we call the "surface fea-
tures" of the text and those processes of signification that we call the
"meaning" or "argument" or "point" of the text are not separable in the
way we ordinarily imagine them to be, but that they feed upon and nour-
ish each other in a most uncanny way. In particular, I would have ar-
gued that legal writings' reliance on figural language-metaphor,
metonymy, and so on-was not adventitious or accidental, something
that one could do without. I would have contended that this reliance
was as essential to legal as to literary expression, and that it could be
exploited by the legal critic-exploited in a way that would show the
contingency and limitations of our ways of thinking about legal issues. I
had planned to write about all these things, and many more, but as I
began to write, I was irresistibly drawn to another problem-different
and yet not so different: the problem of the footnote.
Perhaps this article should be considered as a footnote to a sentence
I have not yet written. Should this make what I have to say less signifi-
cant? The manner in which this question forced itself upon my attention
was almost embarrassing, because the issue was so trivial, so undeserving
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of serious consideration. It is no doubt true that among some law stu-
dents, lawyers, and legal academics, "footnotes are the real measure of
worth in legal writing."1 Yet although we use footnotes to impress each
other with our erudition, I strongly suspect that most legal scholars re-
ally do not think much of footnotes. They are a necessary evil, and per-
haps not even a necessary one. Nowadays, we see increasing calls for
essays with a minimum of footnotes, and a law review article too heavily
footnoted may be dismissed as "overwritten" merely to cater to the re-
quirements of a student edited journal.
Symbolically, of course, the footnote is of minor importance. It is
relegated to the bottom of the page (or, in the case of endnotes, to the
back of the volume). It is excluded from the main body of the text, either
because it disturbs the flow of the text, because it is unessential to the
argument, or because it is a digression or afterthought. The footnote
lives a life of exclusion and marginalization. It is named after the foot,
that lowly organ which spends its life near the ground, in the dirt. We
remark upon the triviality of the footnote in the very metaphors we use
to describe the act of footnoting: one "drops" a footnote, as one might
drop a piece of garbage, or anything unpleasant or of little value.
Consider how we treat footnotes when we read a piece of legal writ-
ing. We skim over them, or even disregard them, on the assumption that
the "essence" of the article is contained in the body of the text. For that
reason, when an author prepares an article for publication, it is usually
good practice to avoid placing too much in the footnotes. Reading foot-
notes distracts the eye, which must move up and down from the top of
the page to the bottom. There is nothing more tedious than bobbing
one's head like a pogo stick only to discover that the footnote contains
nothing of substantive worth, except perhaps for a citation, an irrelevant
bibliographic excursion, or the ubiquitous "Id." Moreover, when there is
something substantive in the footnote, it is more often than not a digres-
sion from the argument of the text, and tends to break the train of
thought of the reader. If the footnotes are endnotes, the problem is even
worse, for no one has the patience to flip back and forth constantly be-
tween the place one is reading and the end of the book. As a result,
footnotes placed at the end of a volume (or even at the end of a chapter)
rarely get read.
Of course, one can deal with this problem by placing the substantive
footnotes at the bottom of the page and the bibliographic footnotes at the
end of the book. But one still has to bob and weave to read the substan-
tive footnotes, and this is quite disconcerting. Indeed, one suspects that
an article that places too much of its substantive argument in the foot-
notes was probably not well organized or well written in the first place.
1 Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 COLO. L. REV. 647, 653 (1985). See also Austin, Footnotes
as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1987).
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The author has not been careful enough to place her thoughts in a logical
order and avoid digressions. Similarly, an abundance of substantive foot-
notes may indicate the work of colleagues or law review editors who have
made the author modify or refine her statements. Such footnotes are a
sign of incompletely justified arguments, or an insufficiently integrated
text. On the other hand, footnotes sometimes appear because an editor
attempted to excise extraneous material, and the author's recalcitrance
resulted in a compromise in which the surplus verbiage has been rele-
gated to a footnote. Such footnotes are the flotsam and jetsam of half-
baked ideas and misplaced authorial pride. In any case, whatever the
reasons for the presence of footnotes, one always suspects that a law re-
view article whose footnotes continually creep up over half of the page
has been poorly written-it could have been rewritten to get rid of at
least some of those footnotes if the author cared enough or had enough
time.
The footnote is inconsequential, inessential, an intellectual bauble
that one could, in theory, do without. That is why it is excluded,
marginalized, banished to the bottom of the page or the end of the book.
Moreover, it is a dangerous inconsequentiality, infecting the purity and
coherence of legal argument. One legal scholar, Judge Abner Mikva, has
gone so far as to declare war on footnotes in legal writing. Following in
the footsteps of Professor Rodell, who gained fame for decrying the de-
clining state of all legal writing,2 Mikva focuses on the footnote as symp-
tomatic of the problems of legal writing in general. 3 For Mikva,
footnotes are a "fungus" that has increasingly infected legal writing.4
Like a biologist depicting the invasion of a parasite into its hapless host,
he glumly reconstructs the inexorable introduction of this monstrosity
into the body of legal writing:
How did footnotes come about? The most likely first use was as a citation
to authority.... Unfortunately, it was all too easy to move from the pure
citation to a description of what the cited authority was about. From there
it was only a small step to explaining how the cited authority was distin-
guishable from the case under consideration, or describing what some other
authority had to say about the cited authority, which is distinguishable
from what some other authority had said about the cited authority, which is
... ad very nauseam. This evolutionary process of footnoting did more
than add to the length and complexity of footnotes; it led to footnotes be-
coming substantive. Distinguishing a case can be a subtle way of undercut-
ting it or overruling it. The footnote thus acquired its full capacity for
mischief. Meat began to fall from the text and into the footnotes.5
A logic of exclusion is at work in this fanciful explanation, a logic
2 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1937); Rodell, Goodbye to Law Re-
views-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279 (1962).
3 Mikva, supra note 1, at 647.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 648.
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more important than the creation myth that Mikva offers us. The foot-
note, itself marginalized and excluded, is at first used to avoid (defer, put
off, exclude) dispute by appeal to authority. Later, it is used to distin-
guish (defer, put off, avoid) the force of other cases. Yet the very process
of exclusion is a process of inclusion-a marshalling of substantive rea-
sons justifying the avoidance, deferral, and distinction. The footnote,
once excluded from the opinion itself, is now the means for excluding
other opinions. It is a nasty turn of affairs, indeed.
Another recurrent image is at work here as well. When Mikva dis-
cusses footnotes, he speaks not only of inclusion and exclusion but of
purity and impurity: not only does he repeat Rodell's accusation that
footnotes are merely "phony excrescences," '6 but he labels the footnote
"an abomination" 7 that often "perverts judicial opinions."'8 The foot-
note, which is parasitic on the text, is an impurity that must be elimi-
nated (excluded) from the body as much as possible. Mikva announces
his decision to purify his legal discourse: "I quit using footnotes in my
opinions several years ago. I quit cold-turkey and it was-and some-
times still is-very painful." 9
Ridding one's self of impurity brings on a shock like being thrown
into cold water-it is an immersion in a ritual bath of purification (which
Jews call a mikva). But can we cleanse ourselves of this impurity in the
same way that a convert to Judaism might wash away her uncleanliness
by going to the mikva? Can we go "the way of Mikva" and purify our-
selves of our need for footnotes? Could we avoid the vices of legal writ-
ing by ridding ourselves of what Mikva sees as their primary symptom-
this "phony excrescence?" Or is our sin original, our fall from grace
elemental, our impurity already present in and inextricably bound up
with the nature of legal writing itself?
Note that Mikva, who follows in the footsteps of Rodell, might be
considered as having produced only a footnote to Rodell's attack on legal
writing in general: Mikva himself notes that his "aim is much lower and
narrower" than Rodell's.' 0 Nor was Rodell content to eschew annota-
tion. His afterthoughts were collected into a new article that might serve
as a footnote to the first. Should we simply be amused at this exercise in
unwitting self-reference, and make some witty remark, such as "purifier,
purify thyself?" Or should we remark upon the inevitability of footnot-
ing, and wonder if this phony excrescence, this parasite, is more than it
appears to be? Is this coincidence, mere wordplay, or is there a greater
logic at work here? Is the problem of the footnote a problem of writing
in general, and of legal writing in particular?
6 Id. at 647 (quoting Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews--Revisited supra note 2, at 289).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 648.
9 Id. at 651.
10 Id. at 647.
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We must defer these questions, and consider once again the question
of the footnote: If this article is only a footnote to a sentence I have not
yet written, what is the ground of its existence? Could it (the foot-note)
stand by itself? If the footnote were something marginal, unessential,
this would be impossible. Indeed, as a mere supplement to the text, the
footnote could be dispensed with altogether. But suppose the footnote
turned out to be essential in some way to the text that it stands beneath?
What if its position in the text were taken as symbolic of its role as a
foundation of the text-as a source of support without which the text
would lose its power in the community of readers? In such a case the
footnote might be necessary to supplement the text, given the conven-
tions of legal scholarship. It would now be the text that could not stand
by itself, for without footnotes its author might be accused of plagiarism
or unjustified assertion.
Here I must make a personal confession. I bet a colleague that I
could write this article without footnotes. Then I came to my discussion
of Mikva's article, and I felt compelled not only by convention, but by a
sense of academic honesty, to cite his previous thoughts on the problem
of the footnote, even as he felt compelled to cite Rodell. The footnote is
not something that either I, or Mikva, or Rodell, could do without.
Mikva, recognizing this, attempted to solve the problem by placing his
citations in the body of the text.
See, eg., Mikva, supra note 1, at 647, 649, 653. [Note to the editors of the Law Review: Please
retain this citation in the bluebook form appropriate to footnotes in the body of the text, as well as
this material in brackets. It will serve to signify my intervention in the field of legal convention-my
insertion of the excluded into the body of the included-my struggle against marginalization, my
fight against a convention that I bow to even as I reject it momentarily. Note that I cannot abandon
this convention indefinitely. If I do, I will simply replace it with another one.]
Mikva struggles artfully to eliminate the need for footnotes, yet even he
cannot do without them: "because I am still full of footnote toxin, I put
my authority citations right in the text. The result is hardly conducive to
a flowing style of writing."11 In later articles, he succumbs to the prac-
tice of placing citations on the margin of the page.12 He makes a bow to
the practice of exclusion even as he excludes exclusion itself. (Note the
delicious irony of an attempt to marginalize, as much as possible, the
process of marginalization itself). Yet his purification has a cost. Mikva
eliminates the lack of clarity created by an abundance of footnotes only
at the risk of muddying up his text.
Here we must pause and wonder. Is the footnote really so marginal,
so unessential as we thought? If Mikva cannot purify his own texts com-
pletely, if the spectre of the footnote keeps reasserting itself in every text
he writes, are we justified in dismissing the problem of the footnote as a
11 I at 652.
12 Eg., Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1123 (1986).
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trivial and superficial feature of language? Or does it represent a more
powerful feature of writing at work here, disguised in a trivial example?
We cannot answer these questions as yet. Instead, we must return
to our original inquiry. If the footnote might be a necessary supplement
to the text, could it even be more important than the text that it stands
beneath? Could it not state an essential point that the text forgot to men-
tion, but which, the author having thought about it, realized that she
needed to say in order to make sense of the text, or in order to meet some
trenchant criticism or pungent objection? In such a case, not only might
the footnote be more important than the text, but the text could even not
stand by itself-its author might be accused of not having thought the
matter through without the footnote.
Perhaps the footnote might state the real point of the argument in a
highly economical way. It is as if one engaged in a debate with a friend,
and as one debated, adding qualifications and clarifications to the posi-
tion one originally started with, one finally saw the real point one was
arguing for all along. Is this at all remarkable? Isn't it one of the pur-
poses of Socratic dialogue? Perhaps, then, the footnote is an after-
thought, but the thoughts that come after the first might be more
important, more clear, more to the point. Here as well the footnote has
become more important than the text.
Perhaps the qualifications and the asides made in the footnote might
be more important to future readers, who want to understand the import
of the text. The text states the argument in a general way, sufficient for
the case at hand, but the footnote touches upon the problems of the all
important next case. There is a particular issue that we have in mind-a
particular application or exception to the general rule that is unclear
from the text and that the footnote clarifies. Is it any wonder then, that
the most eagerly studied parts of Supreme Court opinions are the
footnotes?
Perhaps the footnote does not solve a difficulty, but merely avoids it,
defers it to another day. In Bowers v. Hardwick,1 3 Justice White casually
dropped such a footnote. This is not a case, he said, involving the consti-
tutionality of sodomy laws involving heterosexual couples.14 Yet the
challenged Georgia statute made no distinction between homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy. What was the point of this footnote? Could the
majority have done without it? Or would the question of differential
treatment of heterosexual and homosexual couples have reappeared insis-
tently? Does the footnote defer, or prefigure, the real Hobson's choice
(or Hardwick's choice) that the Court would rather not have addressed?
Perhaps the Court did not want to admit that heterosexual sodomy was
13 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute as applied to consensual homosexual
sodomy).
14 Id. at 188 n.2.
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protected because it could not then justify the exclusion of homosexual
sodomy on principled grounds; yet the Court did not want to hold that
heterosexual sodomy was not protected because that would have sub-
jected it to a flood of criticism from heterosexuals.
Here the footnote performs the crucial task of holding the logic of
the opinion together, by putting off the evil day when these questions will
have to be answered. The footnote is the red cape dangled in front of the
charging bull, and then removed at the last second, preserving the life of
the matador. Does it surprise us that this deferral, this avoidance, is the
crucial move in the opinion (like the movement of the cape at the last
split second)? Does it surprise us that it is this very movement that holds
the opinion together (in the same way that the movement of the cape
prevents the matador's intestines from spilling out into the sand)? Does
it surprise us, then, that this footnote may be as important as anything
else that Justice White said in his opinion?
One could not think of a less important, less essential thing to write
about than the placement of footnotes in legal texts. But if the problem
of the footnote is like a boomerang, like the bad penny that keeps turning
up, perhaps it is not so odd for us to ask if it is not symptomatic or
symbolic of some other feature, of writing in general. And if this feature,
this problem, is symptomatic of writing in general, might we not be enti-
tled to ask if it is also symptomatic of legal writing? And thus embold-
ened, might we not ask a still more "serious" question-whether this
mysterious feature, this disease, this flaw, this problem, is not also symp-
tomatic of a system of law that is and can only be expressed in legal
writing? Dare we hope that from such trivial beginnings an issue of mo-
mentous importance might emerge? Could we not think that our dismis-
sal of those beginnings would itself be a marginalization worth studying
for its own sake?
Yet we must put these speculations aside. It is time to move from
the subject of this article-the footnote-to the subject of this article-
the Footnote. When constitutional scholars talk about the "problem of
the footnote," they are referring to a specific footnote, the Footnote, foot-
note four of United States v. Carolene Products, an opinion written by
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.15 Here indeed is a footnote that has become
more important than the text; that is often read separated from its text;
that can stand alone. Nor is this footnote a trifle, or an insignificant
bauble. It has inspired countless books and law review articles. 16
15 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
16 Eg., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST (1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); Ack-
erman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985); Ball, Judicial Protection of Power-
less Minorities, 59 IowA L. REv. 1059 (1974); Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the
"Insider-Outsider", 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986); Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE. L.J. 1287 (1982); Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products
Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. (1982); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
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The fourth footnote of Carolene Products has not, like its siblings,
lived a life of exclusion and marginalization. It has enjoyed fame and
fortune. Indeed, the footnote has for so long escaped marginalization
that the opposite has tended to happen-the footnote has become much
more important than the body of the opinion it appears in, an opinion
whose actual holding is often forgotten. This is clear in recent com-
mentaries. Professor Ackerman states casually that footnote four ap-
peared in an "otherwise unimportant" case. 17 Justice Powell notes that
"Carolene Products was an otherwise unremarkable decision in the same
line [as West Coast Hotel v. Parrish]."18 Stone's former clerk, Professor
Louis Lusky, remarks that "the opinion occasioned [Justice Stone] no
difficulty as far as the validity of the statute-the only issue on the mer-
its-was concerned." 19 Professor Brilmayer finds the footnote dropped
in an "otherwise unremarkable discourse on the beauties of deference to
legislative choice."'20
Is this a happy ending? Is the victory of the footnote over the text
an unproblematic reassertion of equality, or does it betray its own logic
of marginalization, its own deliberate disregard? If the marginalization
of a footnote is always incomplete, if the problem of the footnote con-
stantly reemerges, try as we might to banish it, will the marginalization
of the body of the opinion be any more successful? Will not the "insignif-
icant" and "unremarkable" opinion in Carolene Products (now relegated
by history to the status of a footnote) haunt our discussions of the foot-
note (now understood as the real "holding" of the case)?
II. THE OPINION AS FOOTNOTE
Carolene Products concerned the constitutionality of the Filled Milk
Act of 1923, "which prohibit[ed] the shipment in interstate commerce of
skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as
to resemble milk or cream. '21 Section 62 of the Act declared that "filled
milk... is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health,
and its sale constitutes a fraud upon the public."' 22 The appellee,
Carolene Products Co., was indicted for shipping in interstate commerce
1087 (1982). The responses to Ely's masterful reinterpretation of footnote four constitute a signifi-
cant body of literature by themselves: See, eg., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Symposium: Judicial Review v. Democracy, 42
OHIO ST. LJ. 1 (1981); Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the
Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture (Book Review), 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547 (1981);
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 TEx. L.
REV. 343 (1981).
17 Ackerman, supra note 16, at 713.
18 Powell, supra note 16, at 1089.
19 Redux, supra note 16, at 1095.
20 Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 1294.
21 304 U.S. at 145-46.
22 Id. at 146 n.1.
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packages of "Milnut," a product which combined skim milk with coco-
nut oil to produce a substance resembling whole milk or cream. Such
artificial substitutes were also marketed under the trade name
"Carolene," from which the company derived its name.23 Carolene
Products Co. argued that the statute was beyond the power of the federal
government both under the commerce clause and the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. 24 (It is often forgotten that Carolene Products is
not only a due process case but also a commerce clause case, a fact which
is usually excluded from edited versions appearing in contemporary Con-
stitutional Law casebooks).
The themes that we found pervasive in our discussion of "the prob-
lem of the footnote"-inclusion and exclusion, marginalization and em-
phasis, purity and impurity-are here in force in this opinion. The
federal government has acted to prevent Milnut from crossing state lines
into various states. Milnut, an impure, adulterated substance which sub-
stitutes a false ingredient to create the illusion of pure, whole milk, must
be excluded from state borders because of the danger to the public
health.
These "surface features" of the text, these contingent facts about the
opinion (contingent because Stone could have chosen any opinion in
which to introduce his ideas) replicate the reasoning and the logic of the
opinion itself. Carolene Products is also about another type of purity and
impurity, another type of inclusion and exclusion-that which affects the
democratic process. Carolene Products, especially in its famous footnote,
is concerned with impurities in the democratic process caused by adulter-
ation of the means of political deliberation (the subject of the footnote's
second paragraph) or by the exclusion of discrete and insular minorities
from full political participation (the footnote's third paragraph). Ac-
cording to the logic of the footnote, certain groups are shut out of the
democratic process, relegated to the periphery. They are, to use Profes-
sor Brilmayer's expression, "insider-outsiders"u-persons subject to the
power of the political community yet excluded from participation within
it.25 The goal of Carolene Products is to restore them to their rightful
place within the polity through judicial supervision of the results of the
democratic process. The role of the judiciary is to exclude legislation
which is the result of impurities in the process, and by this exclusion,
include those persons previously excluded, or prevent their future
exclusion.
Stone's very choice of words in the third paragraph-"discreteness
and insularity" 26-connote the sense of being closed off from the political
process, and (from a less sympathetic standpoint) excluded as impurities
23 See United States v. Carolene-Prods., 7 F. Supp. 500, 501 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
24 304 U.S. at 146-47.
25 Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 1293.
26 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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that are falsely believed to threaten a homogeneous body politic. Be-
cause the majority seeks to keep itself pure, it excludes the pariah from
the political bargaining table, banishes the scapegoat to the periphery.
This vision of politics presented itself with particular urgency in 1938, on
the eve of a World War fought against a regime that considered racial
purity an article of faith.27
Thus, the language of Carolene Products is crafted to break open the
hermetic seal and allow the minority to spread into the inside, to make
the outsider an insider, to put the excluded group in the place it would
have enjoyed had it been counted an insider all along. In so doing,
Carolene Products contests the claim that the minority group is impure.
It labels the purity of the majority a false purity, adulterated in its own,
more insidious way by unreasoning prejudice. Carolene Products holds
that true purity can be achieved only through participation, only by rid-
ding ourselves of the dangerous impurity of thought whose ugliest mani-
festation is racial and religious discrimination.
Yet there is irony in the capacity of this text to refer to itself. The
famous assertions of Carolene Products, made on behalf of the outsiders,
the excluded, are themselves made in the course of an opinion extolling
the rule of the majority. They are made through the use of a literary
device-the footnote-which, as we have already seen, lives a life of
marginalization and exclusion, which itself is considered an impurity and
a hindrance. Indeed, not only do the most famous claims of Carolene
Products appear in a lowly footnote, but the footnote does not even assert
them directly. It merely raises them tentatively, deferentially (in the
manner that the body of the opinion tells us the judiciary ought to be-
have). This diffidence marks all three paragraphs of the footnote:
There may be narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality .... [paragraph one]
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes.., is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
.... [paragraph two]
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious.., or national.., or racial minori-
ties. [paragraph three]28
Here the opinion mocks itself, reserving the discussion of the margi-
nal to the margin, and the impurities of the democratic process to the
impure (footnote). The footnote exhibits what it denies, for it is on the
27 And in the process of fighting this war against a racist regime, our country would make its
own invidious distinctions based upon race, distinctions that would be upheld by the very same
Court that decided Carolene Products. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (execu-
tive order restricting American citizens of Japanese descent held constitutional); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew imposed on Japanese-Americans held constitutional).
28 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
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outside looking in. The self-reference continues as the question of judi-
cial deference is itself deferred to another day. Yet if the opinion mocks
itself, history mocks the opinion by reversing its prioritization, for suc-
ceeding events would soon make the footnote more important than the
body of the opinion.
In tracing the metaphors of purity and impurity, exclusion and in-
clusion, we have noted an uncanny self-reference between what Carolene
Products is about (introduction of adulterated milk into state borders)
and what Carolene Products is about (judicial perfection of the demo-
cratic process through the protection of minority rights). In different
senses, these are both the "subjects" of the opinion. They simply repre-
sent different aspects of its processes of signification, to which we might
also add a third-the opinion's choice of words, its placement of a partic-
ular discussion in the (impure, excluded) footnote, its sentence length
and structure, and so forth. These syntactical features have also joined
into the conversation, obliquely commenting on and contradicting other
aspects of the text. Thus, when I say that Carolene Products is about the
process of marginalization and the reversal of marginalization, about in-
sideness and outsideness, about purity and impurity, I am speaking of
more than the reasoning of the opinion, more than the facts of the opin-
ion, and more than the metaphors and syntactic structures used in the
opinion. I am speaking about all of these at once, just as all of these
speak about each other.
This uncanny conversation of the text with itself is not something
that we shall shy away from in this Article, although as good lawyers we
are taught to disregard such coincidences, leaving them to the students of
poetry and literary texts. Instead, we shall luxuriate in the self-reference
and internal disputation of the text of Carolene Products, riding the play
of signifiers as far as it will take us. For our goal is to understand
Carolene Products not as a legal text, not as a literary text, but as a text,
neither pure nor simple. Only in so doing will we reverse the marginal-
ization of the "irrelevant" features of Carolene Products, which mark the
boundary of exclusion that separates law from literature.
Let us look more closely at this easiest of easy cases, this unremark-
able holding of constitutionality that is Carolene Products. How does
Justice Stone go about his exercise in constitutional redundancy, his beat-
ing of a doctrinal dead horse? In the section of the opinion marked
"First," he begins by dismissing the claim that the Filled Milk Act is
beyond the Congress' powers under the commerce clause:
Congress is free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in
the states for which they are destined it may reasonably conceive to be inju-
rious to the public health, morals or welfare... or which contravene the
The Footnote
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
policy of the state of their destination.2 9
Here Stone nonchalantly intimates that the federal government has
the power to safeguard the traditional objects (health, morals, and wel-
fare) of the police power of the states. This would no doubt have come as
a shock to the old (Lochner era) Court, for as Justice Sutherland had
stated proudly only two years previously, "the... notion that Congress,
entirely apart from those powers delegated by the Constitution, may en-
act laws to promote the general welfare, ha[s] never been accepted but
always definitely rejected by this court."'30 This is not to say that the old
Court might not have upheld the statute under another line of reasoning,
for the Court had permitted Congress to banish from interstate com-
merce products (like liquor, lottery tickets, and prostitution) that were
harmful in and of themselves. 31 Indeed, the old Court had specifically
upheld the Pure Food and Drug Act which prohibited the introduction
of adulterated foods into interstate commerce. 32 Stone might have relied
on these decisions without arguing for a general right of the federal gov-
ernment to promote the health, morals, and welfare of the public through
the regulation of interstate commerce. Yet he is not content to rest on so
narrow a ground:
Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power either because its
motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce
within the states of destination, and is not prohibited unless by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. And it is no objection to the exer-
tion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is at-
tended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power
of the states.33
It is important here to note Stone's agnosticism on the issue of legis-
lative purpose, an agnosticism that will become even more important
only a few pages later in the opinion. Even if Congress' goal was to
usurp for itself the police power of the states through the regulation of
interstate commerce, Stone will not look for an unconstitutional motiva-
tion or investigate the possibility of pretext.34
Stone concludes, then, that "[t]he prohibition of the shipment of fil-
led milk in interstate commerce is a permissible regulation of commerce,
subject only to the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment. ' 35 This brings
us to the portion of the opinion marked "Second." Having obliterated
29 304 U.S. at 147 (citations omitted).
30 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936).
31 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 270-71 (1918).
32 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
33 304 U.S. at 147. This is not, however, as great a break with existing precedents as might first
appear. See Carolene Prods. Co. v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 93 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1937).
34 Cf Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S (4
Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (congressional attempts to exercise power not granted to Congress under
the pretext of enforcing constitutionally granted powers will be struck down as unconstitutional).
35 304 U.S. at 148.
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the distinction between federal and state regulation in this area, Stone
notes that, even during the infamous Lochner era, the evil heyday of sub-
stantive due process, the Court had upheld similar state statutes:
Twenty years ago this Court, in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, held that a
state law which forbids the manufacture and sale of a product assumed to
be wholesome and nutritive, made of condensed skim milk, compounded
with coconut oil, is not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
power of the legislature to secure a minimum of particular nutritive ele-
ments in a widely used article of food and to protect the public from fraud-
ulent substitutions, was not doubted; and the Court thought that there was
ample scope for the legislative judgment that prohibition of the offending
article was an appropriate means of preventing injury to the public. 36
The Lochner era Court would have viewed this law (assuming it
were passed by a state legislature) as an attempt to preserve the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizenry, akin to the eradication of a public
nuisance-it would have seen this law as advancing the public interest in
unadulterated foodstuffs. Given its common-law-inspired understand-
ings of the police power, the Court would easily have upheld the statute
as a reasonable and nonarbitrary exercise of legislative judgment, in ac-
cordance with the rule of Hebe Co. v. Shaw. 37
Yet Stone finds no satisfaction in upholding this act on the limited
basis acknowledged by the old Court. He must devise a new methodol-
ogy of judicial scrutiny. "[W]e might rest decision wholly on the pre-
sumption of constitutionality," says Stone, "[b]ut affirmative evidence
also sustains the statute. ' 38 He tells us that Congress held detailed hear-
ings on the subject of filled milk, gathering evidence from twenty years of
scientific inquiry, and compiling them in reports of the House and Senate
Committees on Agriculture. 39 These committees concluded that the use
of filled milk as a substitute for pure milk was injurious to health and
constituted a fraud on the public; retail merchants often represented fil-
led milk to uneducated consumers as equally good or better than pure
condensed milk sold at a higher price.40 Stone summarizes Congress'
findings in footnote two, a footnote whose comparative significance to
footnote four has been considerably less than their numerical ratio. Re-
ferring to the evidence contained in this second footnote, he states
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which compels a legislature, either
national or state [note again the casual equation], to ignore such evi-
dence, nor need it disregard.., other evidence which amply supports the
conclusions of the Congressional committees. '41 Here Stone artfully
36 Id.
37 See 248 U.S at 303 (legislature permitted to enact regulations to protect public health and
prevent fraud).
38 304 U.S. at 148.
39 Id. at 148-49.
40 Id. at 149 n.2.
41 Id. at 149.
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constructs and then demolishes a straw man-as if someone had actually
argued to the Court that legislatures must legislate without reference to
facts. He wraps around himself the mantle of social science, praising the
careful considerations of a majoritarian body, and impliedly criticizing
the majority of the old Court who thought they knew better than legisla-
tures how to run the nation's economy.
Here, for a brief moment (a second perhaps), it appears as if Stone
has provided us with a new approach to judicial scrutiny, of which foot-
note two is the centerpiece. Here, in "Second," he suggests that the test
of legislative reasonableness is whether Congress has held hearings, gath-
ered evidence, made detailed findings of fact-in short, whether there are
indicia of a sound and considered judgment by the elected representatives
of the people based upon reliable scientific information. If the Congress
has made an effort to learn the facts, if it has sought dispassionately and
conscientiously to ascertain the public interest through a process of delib-
eration and self-education, it is not for the courts to second-guess its
judgment. The theory of "Second," had it been allowed to flourish,
might have developed into something reminiscent of what later writers
would call "Due Process of Lawmaking"-a concern for the procedural
purity of the process by which Congress makes decisions in the public
interest, posed as an alternative to the Lochnerian concern with the end
results of the political process.42 Or, the theory of "Second" might have
developed into a republican conception of politics, with a judicial role
that sought to promote sincere deliberation over cynical logrolling, and
public interest over private advantage. 43
Yet as soon as these alternatives are suggested, they are hurriedly
whisked off the stage, and another, superficially similar, line of reasoning
takes their place. This seemingly harmless and uninteresting rationale
appears in the section labelled "Third," which at first glance appears to
be no more than the warm up act for the real celebrity, its neighbor, the
famous footnote four. Yet before we accept this conventional wisdom,
let us look at both of them more carefully. Let us lay out the body of the
text and the footnote side by side, moving our eyes from one to the other,
and listening to the conversation between them:
42 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1673-87 (2d ed. 1988).
43 See, Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
83:275 (1989)
4There may be narrower scope for opera-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibtion of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370;
Lovell v. Griffn, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scru-
tiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment than are most other types
of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to
vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536;
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints
upon the dissemination of information, see Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-
14, 718-20, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on inter-
ferences with political organizations, see
Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of
peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar con-
siderations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S.
484, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon,
supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinairily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial, inquiry. Compare
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428;
South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177,
184 n. 2, and cases cited.
Third. We may assume for present
purposes that no pronouncement of a
legislature can forestall attack upon
the constitutionality of the prohibition
which it enacts by applying opprobri-
ous epithets to the prohibited act, and
that a statute would deny due process
which precluded the disproof in judi-
cial proceedings of all facts which
would show or tend to show that a
statute depriving the suitor of life, lib-
erty or property had a rational basis.
But such we think is not the pur-
pose or construction of the statutory
characterization of filled milk as injuri-
ous to health and as a fraud on the
public. There is no need to consider it
here as more than a declaration of the
legislative findings deemed to support
and justify the action taken as a consti-
tutional exertion of the legislative
power, aiding informed judicial review,
as do the reports of leglislative com-
mittees, by revealing the rationale of
the legislation. Even in the absence of
such aids the existence of facts sup-
porting the legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for regulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconsti-
tutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is
of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators.4 See
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 and cases
cited. The present statutory findings
affect appellee no more than the
reports of the Congressional Commit-
tees; and since in the absense of the
statutory findings they would be pre-
sumed, their incorporation in the stat-
ute is no more prejudicial than
surplusage.
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As we read these words, laid side by side, we suddenly realize that
we are confronted not with a text and a footnote, not with a major thesis
and a throwaway remark, but with an organic theory of democratic life,
a comprehensive conception of politics. These words separate the world
into two parts; and in each part, a different judicial role, a different judi-
cial rule applies. Yet as we read each column, we experience the troub-
ling feeling that the real issues implicated within it are always outside of
it, lurking in the other column we have momentarily disregarded, and yet
escaping us the moment that we shift our attention. We sense that the
vision of politics, the image of life, created by the footnote and the text,
which boast of their comprehensiveness, is already incomplete, partial,
abstracted, and impure. We sense that in the neat division of the world
into text and footnote cases, another conception of politics has been ex-
cluded, marginalized, silently avoided. Let us focus then, on what every-
one believes to be the most uninteresting portion of this duet, the body of
the opinion, the portion marked "Third," and consider the importance of
its unimportance.
In "Third," as in "Second," Stone preaches deference to legislative
judgments of ends and means. In both of these sections Stone assumes
that legislatures are better able than courts to serve the public interest.
Yet in "Third" Stone now makes it clear that even if the Congress had
held no hearings, had called no witnesses, had engaged in no factfinding
or deliberations whatsoever, the constitutionality of the statute would re-
main unaffected. The Court will simply make up facts and reasons to
justify the distinctions made by the legislation it is presented with, and it
will not strike down the legislation unless the Court cannot invent a sce-
nario in which a rational legislature might have produced the bill before
it.
Here we are brought to the difficulty and the interest in this easy and
uninteresting case. Stone reveals himself supremely unconcerned with
the actual method by which Congress reached its conclusion, or with the
actual purpose that motivated the legislators in banning filled milk. In-
deed, in his fidelity to judicial deference, Stone commits the Court to an
enterprise of disguise and misrepresentation. The goal of a Court faced
with a due process or equal protection challenge henceforth is to paint
the rosiest possible picture of the process of deliberation and of the legis-
lature's purpose. We now see why the results of the Congressional hear-
ings were relegated to footnote two-they were mere window dressing, a
surplusage ultimately unnecessary to the decision of the case. Indeed,
the whole section of the opinion marked "Second" has itself been a sham,
a diversionary tactic.
Only in this light do we understand the full import of other remarks
made almost casually, statements that now take on a more sinister as-
pect. For instance, in "Second," Stone argues that
[T]he prohibition of the statute is inoperative unless the product is "in imi-
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tation or semblance of milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not con-
densed." Whether in such circumstances the public would be adequately
protected by the prohibition of false labels and false branding imposed by
the Pure Food and Drugs Act, or whether it was necessary to go farther
and prohibit a substitute food product thought to be injurious to health if
used as a substitute when the two are not distinguishable, was a matter for
the legislative judgment and not that of the ourts.... Appellee raises no
valid objection to the present statute by arguing that its prohibition has not
been extended to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegeta-
ble fats or oils are substituted for butter fat. The Fifth Amendment has no
equal protection clause, and even that of the Fourteenth, applicable only to
the states, does not compel their legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or
none. A legislature may hit at an abuse which it has found, even though it
has failed to strike at another.44
And again, in "Third," he notes:
[T]he constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a partic-
ular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the Court that those
facts have ceased to exist .... [And] a statute, valid on its face, may be
assailed by proof of facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a
particular article is without support in reason because the article, although
within the prohibited class, is so different from others of the class as to be
without the reason for the prohibition .... But by their very nature such
inquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be re-
stricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could
reasonably be assumed affords support for it.45
By refusing to inquire into less restrictive alternatives, and by re-
jecting attacks based upon over and underinclusiveness, Stone whole-
heartedly embraces agnosticism as to purpose. The rationale of every
governmental action almost always has a nice version and a naughty ver-
sion; inquiry using such proxies as means-ends fit is important, for the
real legislative purpose is not always easily determined otherwise. A
poor fitting of means to ends is the surest sign that the legislature's stated
goals are not its real goals, and that the bill disguises some unseemly
machination or invidious prejudice.
The "nice" version of the Filled Milk Act, for example, is that the
bill was designed as a paternalistic measure to prevent uneducated and
even illiterate consumers from purchasing a less expensive but less nutri-
tious substitute for milk and cream. The legislature was concerned that
consumers would purchase Milnut under the influence of unscrupulous
merchants motivated more by private profit than by public concern.
Conceivably, lack of consumer education might have undermined the ef-
ficacy of labelling Milnut as a milk substitute as required by the Food
and Drug Act.
44 304 U.S. at 151.
45 Id. at 153-54.
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On the other hand, the rationale of the Filled Milk Act also has a
naughty version, as Professor Komesar tells us:
It does not take much scrutiny to see the dairy lobby at work behind the
passage and enforcement of the "filled milk" act. Indeed, the dairy indus-
try's efforts to employ legislation to keep "adulterated" products from gro-
cery shelves and vending booths have a long history, extending from before
Lochner v. New York to the present. It is not too uncharitable, perhaps, to
suggest that concern for the dairies' pocketbooks rather than for the con-
sumer's health best explains the dairy lobby's efforts. In fact, though the
filled milk legislation seemed to be aimed at helping consumers, it may have
harmed them. They were "saved" from "adulterated" products, but only at
the cost of higher prices, while the dairy industry benefited from reduced
competition.46
Komesar's explanation leaves us wondering who was really sacrific-
ing public interest for personal profit. And the doctrine of "Third" gives
us only this reply: Who Cares? This is a very uninteresting opinion, in-
deed. But, the deficiency of interest is not ours, but the opinion's, in its
lack of concern with the integrity of the legislative process.
Moreover, if we dig deeper, forgetting for the moment that we are
lawyers attempting to divine the legal meaning of this text-a text which,
as we have just seen, suffers from an acute case of ennui-we will again
witness how the opinion comments upon and even mocks itself. The por-
tion we have nicknamed "Third" is a remarkable exercise in judicial def-
erence to the legislature. Yet this judicial deference is a deferral both to
and of the legislature. By fabricating a rational basis for this legislation,
the Court not only marginalizes its own role (scrutiny of legislative ac-
tion), but, ironically, also defers and puts off the legislature itself. The
rational basis test requires the Court to disregard the actual legislative
process, and substitute in place of the real legislature (with its adulter-
ated motivations and flaws of reasoning) an ideal legislature, armed with
precisely those facts and considerations that would make a statute rea-
sonable and thus worthy of judicial deference. The Court adopts the
stance of the infatuated lover in the first stages of a crush, who substi-
tutes an ideal picture of the beloved for a less flattering reality.
This legislative deference is legislative deferral, substitution-a sub-
stitution uncannily mocked by the subject of the opinion. Even as the
Court recites Congress' concerns about adulterated products that substi-
tute nondairy fat for milk fat, it engages in its own substitution. It deliv-
ers its own adulterated product (a theory of judicial scrutiny) by
substituting the constitutional theory of "Third" for that of "Second"-a
bait and switch game whose contours have already been noted. The
46 Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis,
51 U. CHi. L. REv. 366, 416 (1984)(footnotes omitted). For a more detailed treatment of the polit-
ical effects of lobbying by the dairy industry, of which the Filled Milk Act was only one example, see
Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1988 S. Cr. REv. 397.
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Court replaces one conception of the judicial role-the inquiry into the
actual deliberative process in democratic institutions-with another: the
creation of excuses for pluralist hardball. In like fashion, the cream of
actual legislative deliberation is skimmed away, and replaced with the
artificial substitute of an imagined and ideal purpose. The Court then
passes off its product to the ultimate consumer, claiming that this new
judicial role is better (and less costly to society) than a more active judi-
cial role (read here substantive due process). Finally, not only is the
Court's new product adulterated, but it is even mislabeled as judicial
scrutiny.
Here too, the issue of purity reappears in a highly problematical
fashion. It is hard to know what is pure and what is impure in the por-
tions of the opinion marked "Second" and "Third." Consider: the
Court, suspecting that the legislative motivation behind the Filled Milk
Act is not pure-that the Act is rather an attempt by the dairy lobby to
subdue its economic competitors-hides this impurity by constructing a
"purer" purpose for public consumption. Yet the purity of this purpose
is artificial (and hence also impure). Consider: usurpation of the legisla-
ture's role introduces an impurity into our democratic system; requiring
actual purity of motive on the legislature would encroach upon the purity
of democracy. Yet abdication of the judicial role leaves no protection of
the process from self-adulteration; it may reduce the courts to apologists
for a process that is really impure.
The issues of substitution, purity, and deferral do not escape us.
They return with each investigation into this seemingly unremarkable
opinion. The Carolene product of Carolene Products is already, also, and
always adulterated, a substitution of an unhealthy and artificial filler (in-
stitutional considerations, appeal to a nonexistent legislative considera-
tion) for a more searching inquiry. Might we not inquire, as Congress
did, whether this substitution will not ultimately injure the public's
health? When, as here, the Court offers us a less costly product, will we
not be tempted to choose it instead of a healthier, albeit more difficult
inquiry into the processes of democratic deliberation? Will this purchase
of shoddy goods not leave us worse off in the long run?
III. THE NEW CIVIL RELIGION AND ITS PROPHETS
In developing the problematics of this uninteresting opinion-an
opinion which professes no interest in the interests of special interests-
we seem to have garnered for ourselves a tidy sum (of interest). How
could our interpretations of so marginal a product have borne so much
fruit? Perhaps Carolene Products is not so unimportant an opinion after
all. Perhaps Stone was right to place his famous footnote in the margin
of the opinion, for the problems that give rise to this footnote are already
implicated in the text.
Carolene Products is the post-1937 Court's first extended discussion
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and elaboration of a theory of judicial review proclaimed in a very fa-
mous opinion: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.47 West Coast Hotel, and
its companion in the Commerce Clause area, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation,48 announce the end of the Lochner period in Supreme
Court jurisprudence; together they constitute the boundary that sepa-
rates modem from premodern constitutional law. Yet if West Coast Ho-
tel forms the boundary, Carolene Products is the first way station in this
hitherto uncharted territory.
West Coast Hotel is never mentioned in Carolene Products; the for-
mer dealt with a line of cases involving labor regulations while the latter
concerned itself mainly with cases involving regulation of adulterated
foodstuffs. Yet the revolution of West Coast Hotel was very much on the
minds of the justices as they decided Carolene Products. The former de-
cision had left many important and unanswered questions. What was the
promise of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish? What contours would the new
revolution in constitutional jurisprudence take? For Justice Stone, the
answer was easy enough. As Stone's former clerk, Professor Lusky, re-
ports, even before 1937, Stone "had trumpeted a call for ungrudging ac-
ceptance of the legislative judgment, for a vigorous presumption of
constitutionality, and for leaving governmental decisions to legislators,
who had ready access to knowledge of the needs and demands of the
sovereign people." 49 For Stone, the doctrinal strategies of "Third" were
the obvious continuation of the glorious revolution of 1937.
Yet however obvious this interpretation of West Coast Hotel was to
the Justices in 1938, we can see in hindsight that it was not a necessary
development. To be sure, there is plenty of language in Chief Justice
Hughes' opinion celebrating deference to the legislature. But West Coast
Hotel announces many other revolutionary themes besides that one in the
course of upholding Washington's minimum wage law for women:
The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the
"sweating system," the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insuf-
ficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very helplessness
the occasion of a most injurious competition .... There is additional and
compelling consideration which recent economic experience has brought
into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to
their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support upon
the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay.... The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a
47 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law for women, and overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
48 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that National Labor Relations Act was not beyond Congress'
powers under the Commerce Clause).
49 Lusky, supra note 16, at 1095.
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subsidy for unconscionable employers.50
As Professor Tribe has argued, these words could have been under-
stood as a substantive decision about the liberty protected by the due
process clause-a decision that "in twentieth century America, mini-
mum wage laws, as a substantive matter, are not intrusions upon human
freedom in any constitutionally meaningful sense, but are instead entirely
reasonable and just ways of attempting to combat economic subjugation
and human domination. ' 51 West Coast Hotel could have been seen as the
clarion call for a new doctrine of substantive economic justice, where
economic rights were based not upon parameters derived from the com-
mon law but from evolving notions of economic fairness in a nascent
post-industrial America. To be sure, this would have substituted one
form of economic substantive due process for another. Yet one could
have replied that the difference between them lay in the fact that the
latter was the right understanding of economic substantive due process in
modem times.
Similarly, West Coast Hotel could have been understood as question-
ing the political neutrality of the status quo through its deconstructive
claim that "[t]he community is not bound to provide what is in effect a
subsidy for unconscionable employers. '5 2 This delightfully perverse
statement responds to an unstated premise in Lochner era jurisprudence.
Alterations- of common law rules of contract-for example, those
designed to ameliorate the inequality of bargaining power between the
parties-were viewed by the Lochner Court as subsidizing one of the par-
ties (or the public at large) at the expense of the other. Such alterations
were impermissible redistributions of wealth unless they fell within the
Court's limited conception of the police power or were otherwise in aid
of common law rights.
Yet, as Professor Sunstein points out, "[t]he notion of subsidy is...
incoherent without a baseline from which to make a measurement."5 3 If
the employer suffered from the public's decision to enact a minimum
wage law, the employee suffered from the public's decision not to enact a
minimum wage law. One might object that in the latter case the state did
nothing by failing to enact such a law, but the logic of West Coast Hotel
implies that having a common law of contracts that protects some expec-
tations but not others is a type of action for which the state is ultimately
responsible.54 Hence, West Coast Hotel might have led to a rejection of
the common law or the status quo as the benchmark for determining
whether economic, political, or civil-fights had been violated.5 5 This too,
50 300 U.S. at 398-99.
51 L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 585 (emphasis in original).
52 300 U.S. at 399.
53 Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 876 (1987).
54 Id.
55 See id. at 882.
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would have substituted a new kind of substantive protection for the
older, common law inspired jurisprudence of the Lochner Court.
Thus, West Coast Hotel represented a revolution, but a revolution of
imprecise contours. It could have been a revolution, as Tribe suggests, in
which economic liberty was still protected, but through a different sys-
tem of values. Or, as Sunstein suggests, it could have been a decision to
reject the belief in a neutral market ordering created by a common law
for which the state was not responsible. In either case the Court would
not have foresworn the legitimacy of substantive review of legislative en-
actments, or the requirement that legislation demonstrate a "fair and
substantial relation" to its stated objectives.56 In either case, the Court
could have claimed that it was a true servant of the revolution. Yet
Carolene Products took a third approach. It saw the vice of Lochner, and
the virtue of West Coast Hotel, in purely institutional terms. Under this
interpretation, the revolution of 1937 was fought not over the content of
values but over who was to choose those values-after the revolution,
such choices were excluded from the purview of courts and placed solely
in the hands of legislatures. Thus, the portion of Carolene Products
marked "Third" is by no means insignificant or unimportant. It repre-
sents the reinterpretation of the revolution in terms of a seemingly value
neutral deference to legislative will.
And here the significance of Carolene Products' seeming insignifi-
cance is revealed. Carolene Products is the humble servant of the messi-
anic West Coast Hotel, playing St. Paul to the latter's Jesus. If Jesus
came to offer a message of salvation for the world, St. Paul told us what
that message was. And in interpreting that message for the Gentiles, St.
Paul did more than act as a messenger. He invented an entirely new
religion-Christianity.
One must pardon the temptation to see the religious analogy here, in
this New Testament of our Civil Religion (the Constitution), in this most
ecclesiastical of cases, which even bears the name Parrish. Here is the
long hoped for Messiah, come to sweep away the old law and replace it
with the new (yet at the same time insisting that He came not to abolish
the law but to fulfill it).57 Here is the faithful servant, St. Paul, who in an
effort to attract the heathen, downplays the role of good works (read here
substantive review) in his Master's sayings, and informs us that faith
alone (in the democratic process) is both necessary and sufficient for
salvation. The anti-establishment and revolutionary elements of the
Master's message, the identification with the disadvantaged and the poor,
are all marginalized, deemphasized. Good works will not save us, for no
one is without sin, and hence no one can gain salvation merely by pursu-
ing the right values; all will ultimately fall short of the mark. The way to
296
56 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
57 Matthew 5:17.
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heaven is not by good works, the enforcement of the proper choice of
values, but through faith in the new civil religion-democracy.
And who writes the epistles that champion this interpretation?
Who creates this new civil religion of salvation through faith alone? It is
Justice Stone, the apostle whose faith in democracy disguises his agnosti-
cism towards legislative purpose. Stone's opinion is both St. Paul and St.
Peter-Stone's opinion is the petros (or rock) upon which this new
church is founded.
What was the advantage of the interpretation Stone created in
Carolene Products, the promise of this new civil religion? Quite simply,
Carolene Products seemed to offer an alternative to, and a retreat from,
value-laden decisionmaking by the judiciary. To Stone and his brethren,
the erratically high level of judicial scrutiny adopted by the old Court
had only resulted in a superimposition of its economic and political views
onto those of legislatures. In the new constitutional regime, a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality of majoritarian acts and a low level of judi-
cial scrutiny would prevent the judiciary's intervention into controversial
value choices that were properly the concern of the democratic process.
Stone's interpretation of the 1937 revolution counseled that preemptive
impositions of value by the judiciary should be eliminated, or at the very
least, seriously curtailed.
Ideally, the judiciary would have avoided imposing substantive
value choices entirely. Yet this ideal was impossible to achieve in prac-
tice, for taken seriously, one would have to overrule Marbury v. Madison
and the doctrine of judicial review itself. Moreover, it presented a poten-
tial embarrassment. Stone and his allies on the Court were quite con-
cerned that majorities might seek to abridge civil liberties of speech,
press, and peaceable assembly, and had joined in several opinions dis-
pensing with the presumption of constitutionality and applying a rela-
tively high level of judicial scrutiny where freedom of speech as opposed
to contract was involved.58 Under the judicial nonscrutiny envisioned in
"Third," an unscrupulous majority could soon make short work of polit-
ical opponents, and America might easily degenerate into the very sort of
fascism that Stone and his brethren saw percolating on the other side of
the Atlantic. The problem for Stone and his like-minded colleagues was
how to reconcile their instinct for the preservation of civil liberties with
their commitment to legislative deference and judicial self-restraint. The
revolution they had fought for was in serious danger of unravelling intel-
lectually at the very moment of its success.
According to the institutional interpretation of the 1937 revolution,
preemptive value choices had to be excluded from the judicial role. They
represented the evil of the old religion, an impurity and a danger to the
58 See, eg., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Lusky, supra note 16, at 1094-95.
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democratic faith. Yet the need for such preemptive choices reasserted
itself as soon as they were excluded. A high level of judicial scrutiny-a
serious commitment to judicial review-was both necessary and danger-
ous to the new civil religion; necessary because of the desire to preserve
civil liberties, dangerous because it threatened the intellectual coherence
of the new Court's teachings.
If a serious commitment to judicial scrutiny could not be eliminated
in all cases, perhaps it could be confined to its appropriate sphere. The
dirty and disgusting job of judicial review might be banished to areas
demarcated in advance, much as one places lepers, criminals, or the in-
sane in a colony, prison, or asylum. The messy and questionable task of
judicial scrutiny might be confined to particular types of legislation, to a
particular group of factual situations, without infecting the purity of the
general commitment to democracy. This confinement, this quarantine,
might allow the disease or abnormality to be treated on its own terms
without risking an infection of the general populace. Here is the solution
of Carolene Products-a partial exclusion, which divides the constitu-
tional world into a rule (deference, the kingdom of "Third") and an ex-
ception (scrutiny, the hospital of the footnote, where diseases are treated,
or otherwise prevented from injuring the outside world).
And with this exclusion comes a new myth to justify ihe exile, the
marginalization, the neat division of the world into rule and exception,
normal case and abnormal, healthy and sick. It is well stated by Justice
Powell:
The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our constitu-
tion assumes that majorities should rule and that the government should be
able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legisla-
tures should be allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain groups
that cannot participate effectively in the political process. And the political
process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the way it
protects most of us. 59
The key words in this passage-the words that establish and justify
the logic of exclusion and marginalization-are "for the most part."
Note their implications: The political process works effectively most of
the time; representative democracy can generally be trusted to act in the
public interest. Nevertheless, in a small, selected group of cases, which
can be readily identified, the process malfunctions. In that marginal set
of cases the judiciary properly may subject legislation to a higher level of
scrutiny, not because it is authorized to impose its value choices upon the
majority, but because the process itself is defective, undemocratic, im-
pure. And in the very act of excluding these marginal situations from the
norm, the judiciary demonstrates a double fidelity to democracy: First,
because it avoids interfering in the normal processes of democratic insti-
tutions, and second, because it intervenes in those and only those abnor-
59 Powell, supra note 16, at 1088-89.
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mal cases in which the democratic ideals that justify judicial deference
have been disserved.
Here the Court takes for itself a new role-the physician who tends
to the diseased, or the pastor who brings succor and comfort to the crimi-
nal or to the leper. And it is well that the Court should confine its work
to this very small class of cases-the derelicts of the democratic process.
For as Jesus tells us, "[t]hose who are well have no need of a physician,
[only] those who are sick." 6 The Court's proper role is as master of the
marginal, like the doctor who preserves health by treating the sick, the
prison warden who preserves safety by sequestering the dangerous, the
minister who preserves morality by preaching to the sinful.
The metaphors of purity and impurity, sickness and health, inclu-
sion and exclusion, are busily at work in the language of the third para-
graph of the footnote. Stone speaks of prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities as a "special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities. ' ' 61 Thus, prejudice is a special condition, an impurity
or illness that is limited in scope, unusual, a defect that one is not likely
to find everywhere. It is precisely because of its limited nature that it can
be excluded, cut off, placed outside the political process through judicial
supervision. The task of the judiciary, then, is to exclude or set aside
those legislative enactments that are the result of this special condition.
The rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion closes in upon itself, for exclusion
will be remedied by a form of exclusion. The judiciary outlaws those
decisions and actions that result from an imperfect political process, leav-
ing the purer, democratic products of the process untouched and
uncontaminated.
Yet at the very moment in which Stone makes this division, impuri-
ties have already infiltrated into the political system. For we have no
reason to believe that prejudice, lack of deliberation, stereotypical think-
ing, and invidious motivation appear magically only during consideration
of legislation that tramples upon civil liberties. 62 If the political process
is impure where noneconomic rights are at stake, it is equally impure
when economic rights are concerned. Yet this is the governing myth of
the new Civil Religion-the process will never fail us when the legisla-
ture considers particular subject matters (economic rights) while it often
fails us when considering others (political rights).
Merely to state this myth is to reveal its fictional character. Yet the
task Stone set for the judiciary in "Third" was to perpetuate that myth,
and where economic rights were involved, to disguise every prejudice as a
principle, every adulterated action as the servant of the public interest.
60 Matthew 9:12.
61 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
62 Nor do we have reason to believe that such behavior is not manifested by those persons who
actively support and defend civil liberties. See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 739-40.
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Once again we see that the substitution of "Third" for "Second" was
more than accidental, that it was essential to the logic of Stone's work.
Stone could not have taken what he said in "Second" seriously: to do so
would have admitted the possibility that the impurity in the political pro-
cess could not be cabined in, that it might infect even purely economic
legislation. He would have had to admit that legislation that does not
directly address civil liberties or the rights of suspect categories, even
legislation neutral on its face, might be contaminated by the same disease
and deformity that abides in the exile of the footnote.63 Yet how could
he concede that the epidemic had spread beyond the confines of the hos-
pital, that the criminal population had escaped their prison, without de-
stroying the essential myth, the faith of the new Civil Religion? Such an
alternative was too horrible to be contemplated. And so, Carolene Prod-
ucts perpetuates a deception through the artful substitution of "Third"
for "Second," clinging all the while to its pluralist faith in a discernible
public interest-a public interest that is more than just the vector sum of
political forces and yet is achieved only through their summation.
IV. THE FOOTNOTE AS OPINION
The governing myth of Carolene Products-the division of legisla-
tive acts into normal and abnormal, democratic and depraved, is repli-
cated in the syntactic structure of the written opinion. The body of the
opinion discusses the (deferential) role of the Court in the usual case,
while the discussion of the abnormal, exceptional case of a defective pro-
cess is placed in a footnote. Once again, however, the opinion's self-imi-
tation involves self-commentary and self-contradiction. From the
placement of the footnote as a footnote-as a marginal addition to an
otherwise complete judicial opinion-one might have gathered that the
discussion in footnote four was unessential to the logic of the opinion it
appeared in. And indeed, as Professor Lusky reports, Justice Stone did
not intend for footnote four to be anything more than exploratory-it
was designed merely to stimulate discussion on the issue of when higher
levels of scrutiny would be appropriate. 64 However, whether the text of
this footnote actually appeared in this or any other opinion, its logic was
hardly adventitious. The theory of footnote four was necessary to give
intellectual coherence to Stone's particular interpretation of West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, an interpretation based upon a pluralist conception of
politics in which the Court had only a limited role, just as we have al-
ready seen that the substitution of "Third" for "Second" was equally
necessary to this conception. And if the logic of this footnote was only
tentative and not fully developed, this simply made all the more problem-
atic the opinion it supported.
63 See Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 1305-13.
64 See Lusky, supra note 16, at 1098-99.
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Stone's institutional interpretation of West Coast Hotel (the third
section of Carolene Products) raised the embarrassing question why judi-
cial deference was not appropriate in every case. The reasoning of
"Third" seemed to offer no way of picking and choosing among subjects
for more searching judicial review. Yet the Court did, in actual practice,
strike down some statutes but not others. If so, the Court's decision to
defer in a particular case might be seen as just as much a value choice as
the decision to scrutinize strictly in another case, and one was back to the
vices of Lochner.
Thus, whenever the Court decided an economic regulation case, the
logic of the footnote hovered at the periphery, supporting the Court's
decision by answering the unspoken objection: "Why did you defer here
and not elsewhere?" Only by characterizing the Court's role as properly
concerned with marginal failures of process (the subject of the footnote)
that called for more searching judicial scrutiny could the Court justify its
new role (or nonrole) in the general area of social and economic regula-
tion (the subject of the text). Only by explaining that higher levels of
scrutiny were justified by the ideals of democracy themselves and not by
a particular substantive conception of values could the new Roosevelt
Court distinguish its work from the substantive due process review of the
hated Lochner Court. And only by linking the Court's abandonment of
the presumption of constitutionality to the ideals that justified the pre-
sumption could the Court explain why it deferred to the legislature in
some cases but not others.
Thus in every economic due process case the logic of the footnote is
deferred yet present, silent yet secretly evoked. In the doctrinal picture
painted by the Court, it is kept outside the canvas, yet through this very
act of exclusion it becomes the frame that keeps the canvas taut. Here,
then, is yet another sense in which the footnote dominates the text. For
not only has footnote four become more famous than the opinion in
Carolene Products, it also supports and justifies the pluralist conception
of politics in post-1937 constitutional jurisprudence. It is aptly called a
footnote-for just as the body cannot stand or move without feet, the
edifice of modernist constitutional law cannot support itself without com-
plementary theories of judicial review and nonreview.
Yet, at the same time, if the logic of the footnote supported the logic
of the opinion (and hence by extension the logic of post-1937 economic
regulation cases in general), the converse was also true: The logic of the
famous footnote four was predicated upon the very interpretation of
West Coast Hotel that necessitated the footnote's existence. Footnote
four owes as much to "Third" as "Third" owes to it. This footnote is the
remedy to a disease, yet like a vaccine it bears the characteristics of the
sickness it seeks to cure. The articulation of a justification of judicial
review based upon failures of process is the natural result of the institu-
tional interpretation of the 1937 revolution which saw the rough and
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tumble of legislative bargaining as the appropriate method for ascertain-
ing and enforcing values. Because the text of Carolene Products defends
judicial deference in pluralist terms, the footnote also defends judicial
nondeference in pluralist terms-that (putting enforcement of the Bill of
Rights to one side) judicial review is only justified to the extent that it
can be tied to the correction of the limited flaws of democratic
pluralism. 65
The faith of Carolene Products was that one could exclude values
from the judicial role, and by casting them out substitute the task of
purifying the democratic process. Yet, as so many commentators have
noted, the purported exclusion of value that justified Carolene Products is
a false exclusion, for controversial value choices arise anew the moment
that others are avoided. The Supreme Court still had to identify those
minorities and those fundamental liberties that were to be protected by
more searching judicial scrutiny. Thus, the problem of the footnote reap-
peared insistently, for the more value choices were marginalized and ex-
65 But can we put the Bill of Rights to one side? Or doesn't this relegation to the periphery
simply recreate the same set of problems discussed throughout this article? If the first paragraph of
footnote four-which sees enforcement of the Bill of Rights as an essential judicial function--can be
so casually disregarded, if it is itself a footnote within a footnote, will this act of marginalization not
result in its own set of difficulties that will trouble us later on?
The first paragraph was inserted into the body of footnote four at the request of Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes (the author of West Coast Hotel), who wrote Stone that he was "somewhat
disturbed" by the theory of the footnote. Lusky, supra note 16, at 1106. The different treatment of
cases involving the Bill of Rights, argued Hughes, should "lie not in the nature of the test but in the
nature of the right invoked." Id. (emphasis in original). Hughes meant by this cryptic remark that
it was unnecessary to create new levels of scrutiny for cases involving rights like speech. Rather, the
judicial function should be the same in all cases under the Due Process Clause or the Bill of Rights.
The contours of what would constitute a reasonable restriction of speech should be determined by
the nature of the right of free speech, and not by reference to an artificial test of higher or lower
scrutiny. See Friedman, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice 1930-1941: The Complexities of
Moderation (1978) (Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis). In this respect Hughes was prescient, for the
creation of the two tier system of scrutiny did indeed result in future difficulties, as discussed infra
text accompanying notes 71-85.
Justice Stone, however, did not directly address this criticism. Rather he simply included cases
involving the Bill of Rights in his laundry list of situations in which a higher level of scrutiny might
apply. Stone's grafting of Hughes' objection into the body of the footnote altered the nature of the
objection, and at the same time introduced a dangerous supplement into the theory of the footnote
itself. While the second and third paragraphs justify judicial review as a means of counteracting
pathologies in the representative structure of democracy, the first paragraph appears to justify judi-
cial power on the basis of textual commitments in the Constitution itself. It thus undercuts the non-
textual or meta-textual justification of judicial review in the succeeding paragraphs. Moreover, while
the second and third paragraphs envision judicial protection of relatively neutral pluralist and demo-
cratic values (as opposed to the particular values of particular majorities), the first paragraph sug-
gests that the judiciary should enforce the Constitution's openly substantive commitments listed in
the Bill of Rights. See Tribe, supra note 16, at 1065-70. Moreover, as discussed in the next section
of text, to defend these substantive choices on the ground that they, too, are somehow necessary to
the protection of democratic values, threatens to call into question the original assumption of value
neutrality.
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cluded, the more the Court depended upon them in its appointed task of
purifying the democratic process. Justice Powell aptly notes that
[flar from initiating a jurisprudence of judicial deference to political judg-
ments by the legislature, Footnote 4-on this view-undertook to substi-
tute one activist judicial mission for another .... Where the Court before
had used the substantive due process clause to protect property rights, now
it should use the equal protection clause-a generally forgotten provision
that Holmes once dismissed as 'the usual last resort of constitutional argu-
ments'-as a sword with which to promote the liberty interests of groups
disadvantaged by political decisions.66
The problem of the footnote is especially powerful in this passage.
Here the excluded, the marginalized, and the cast out-judicial activism,
the equal protection clause, and disadvantaged minorities-combine to
subvert the new constitutional regime. The previously discredited equal
protection clause becomes the new champion of substantive values. Ar-
guments about liberty are easily disguised as claims about equality and
vice versa-an interchangeability familiar to every student who has taken
an introductory course in constitutional law.
Moreover, as soon as the Court tried to exclude substantive due pro-
cess from consideration, it simply reappeared in a new guise. As many
scholars have noted (and especially in the numerous discussions of Dean
Ely's excellent book), one needs a substantive vision-of what kinds of
discrimination are invidious, of what kinds of groups are deserving of
judicial protection, of the substantive content of fairness, of the rights of
due process-in order to determine whether the democratic process has
in fact misfired. 67 And here, says Justice Powell,
[one] must pause to wonder. If I am correct about the implicit link between
a substantive judgment and a malfunction of process, then one may inquire
whether we have not returned in some cases to a kind of substantive due
process. And one may also wonder what Stone-who had fought so vigor-
ously against substantive due process-would have had to say about that.68
V. THE PARTIALITY OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS
The metaphors of Carolene Products are metaphors of inclusion and
exclusion-of filled milk, footnotes, minorities, and defects in the demo-
cratic process. Yet Carolene Products is also exemplary of an even more
basic form of inclusion and exclusion-the inclusion and exclusion that is
necessary to theoretical conceptions expressed in our imperfect language.
In identifying the pluralist, institutional features of Carolene Products,
we have discovered that Carolene Products is a partial reading of West
Coast Hotel, a particular path of doctrinal development chosen over
66 Powell, supra note 16, at 1089-90 (quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
67 See, eg., Brilmayer, supra, note 16; Ackerman, supra, note 16; Tribe, supra note 16; Brest,
The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981).
68 Powell, supra note 16, at 1091.
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other unarticulated alternatives. Like the development of Christian the-
ology, the sense and direction of Carolene Products is partially identical
to and partially different from the sense and direction of the texts it
builds upon and seeks to interpret, including some aspects of these texts
while excluding others.
This inclusion and exclusion, this partiality, is a characteristic fea-
ture of law conceived of as writing, as the creation of a series of texts
through the reading and rereading of previous authoritative materials.
Each successive reading is both a partial reading and a partial misreading
of what has gone before, each understanding both a partial understand-
ing and a partial misunderstanding. And by misreading and misunder-
standing, we do not mean merely mistaking the author's intentions, but
rather a selective grasping (or inclusion) of the unspoken possibilities of
previous texts, which channels future interpretations and yet also creates
new possibilities for understanding (and misunderstanding). 69
Yet to say that law is a kind of writing is also to say that Law is a
kind of composition. Law, like religion, is a way of describing the world
to ourselves, and in so describing, it helps to create that which it de-
scribes. Law remakes the world and ourselves as we use it to regulate
and direct our activity. Thus we might say that law is constitutive-not
only of itself, but also of our selves, our goals and values, and the society
in which we live. 70 Yet the constitution and composition of our texts
(and of our lives), is always both inclusion and exclusion; for it is deter-
mined both by what is absorbed and what is omitted, what is central and
what is peripheral, what is emphasized and what goes unnoticed.
Carolene Products exemplifies these facets of law as writing.
Carolene Products carries with it a dominant conception of political life,
which is, of course, partial. This conception is both an inclusion (of a
conception of politics, of a practice of judicial review, of a theory of insti-
tutional roles) and an exclusion (of alternative conceptions). Moreover,
this partiality is not accidental. A deconstructionist would say that the
very act of intellectual conception inevitably involves exclusion. The
word "conceive" itself, derived from the Latin concipere, "to take in,"
connotes the simultaneous inclusion of some while leaving others outside
(just as biological conception can only occur where an egg is fertilized by
one sperm to the exclusion of others).
Yet simultaneously deconstruction argues that-unlike the process
of biological conception-the marginalization and exclusion necessary
for intellectual conception is never complete. Traces of banished and
deemphasized alternatives lurk within the dominant conception, support-
ing it and at the same time calling its dominance into question. This is
69 See Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911,
931-42 (1988); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 774-85 (1987).
70 See J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW
(1985).
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the problem of the footnote writ large, the non-trivial lesson to be learned
from the trivial example with which we began this Article. Indeed, our
ability to glean important insights from the trivial is itself an example of
the deconstructive point.
We have already seen how Carolene Products excluded the impuri-
ties of Lochner only to introduce new impurities in its own conception of
judicial review, how it demarcated areas in which the political process
was defective only by refusing to see deficiencies in the process as a
whole, how it banished value choices from the judicial role only to see
them reemerge in other contexts. The history of Carolene Products is the
history of our discovery of its partiality, of its intellectual marginaliza-
tions. For history deconstructs-revealing that the dominant concep-
tions we use to understand the world at a particular point in time are
increasingly inappropriate for solving the problems of later years. As
events progress, altering our awareness of social reality, we discover the
importance of what our theories marginalized or neglected, and how our
conception has sown the seeds of its own destruction, adulteration, and
putrification in what it has overlooked, in what it has excluded. Ironi-
cally, the impurity of a dominant conception-the source of its eventual
decomposition and decay-is due less to what it lets in than to what it
leaves out. Thus, as we enter the next decade, the next century, we will
find that, for all the good Carolene Products has done us, its shortcom-
ings will become more and more apparent.71
For example, in the innocent division of the world into text and
footnote cases, between the heightened scrutiny of footnote four and the
non-scrutiny of "Third," we can see the beginnings of the bankruptcy of
equal protection jurisprudence in the 1970s. We cannot place the blame
for these difficulties entirely on Justice Stone, who offered footnote four
as the beginning of a search for a modern constitutional jurisprudence.
Rather, the fault lies in the shortsightedness of his successors, who al-
lowed his suggestions to ossify into an unthinking paradigm of judicial
practice. Thus, by the 1970s, Stone's revolutionary approach had hard-
ened into an equal protection doctrine featuring two tiers of scrutiny,
where government action either received no review at all or a virtually
irrebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality. The only issue in most
cases was which level of scrutiny applied, which in turn reduced to the
question whether a suspect class or a fundamental right was affected.
At first, this ossification did not appear to create any significant dis-
advantages. During the last years of the Warren Era and the first years
of the Burger Era, the Supreme Court continued to add new fundamental
rights, such as the right to travel in Shapiro v. Thompson,72 the right to
marry in Loving v. Virginia,73 and the right of access to courts in Boddie
71 See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 744-46.
72 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
73 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
The Footnote
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
v. Connecticut.74 Yet because the two-tier theory seemed to offer no al-
ternative between total deference and total unconstitutionality, the recog-
nition of new fundamental rights and suspect classes was made
increasingly difficult. This difficulty suited conservatives like Justice
Rehnquist perfectly well, for it guaranteed that the Court would be loath
to introduce new theories requiring strict scrutiny. In such situations,
the federal courts were left with only the alternative of rational basis
review, which in most cases would do little to disturb the economic sta-
tus quo.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court would not revise the list of
suspect classes later on, as it did in the case of gender, or that it would
not devise alternative theories of scrutiny, as it did in cases like Plyler v.
Doe75 or City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.76 Nevertheless, the
two tier system of equal protection of the 1970s created an orthodoxy, a
doctrinal hurdle, that any new theories of discrimination or essential
rights had to overcome. The gender and illegitimacy cases, for example,
were regarded as exceptional situations that did not fit easily into the
"normal" mode of constitutional analysis. And in those cases where the
Court was unable or unwilling to abandon theoretical normalcy-Dan-
dridge v. Williams,77 Rodriguez,78 Harris v. McCrae79 and Beazer80-it
relegated many of the most important types of flaws of the democratic
process to the nonprotections of the rational basis test. 81 In this sense,
later cases like Plyler and Cleburne must be understood as sports that
74 401 U.S. 371 (1971)(recognizing right of access to courts in specific context of divorce
proceedings).
75 457 U.S. 202 (1982)(applying equivalent of middle level scrutiny to state's denial of free public
education to children of illegal aliens).
76 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(applying heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational basis review with
respect to discrimination against mentally retarded persons).
77 397 U.S. 471 (1970)(upholding maximum welfare grant of $250 a month regardless of family
size).
78 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)(upholding unequal system
of public school financing).
79 448 U.S. 297 (1980)(upholding federal decision to finance expenses of childbirth under Medi-
caid program but not medically necessary abortions).
80 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979)(upholding policy of not hiring
persons receiving methadone maintenance treatment even where applicants had successfully under-
gone treatment for at least a year).
81 The partiality and incompleteness of Carolene Products' conception of judicial review became
apparent in the rapidly evolving social and economic circumstances that followed the Second World
War. By the 1970s the nature of the economy and governmental regulation had changed sufficiently
that few economic equal protection and due process cases before the federal courts involved direct
regulations of freedom of contract. Instead, the very success of the New Deal in fostering redistribu-
tive social welfare programs had set the stage for important constitutional questions concerning the
distribution of government entitlements like social security, medical benefits, and education. Simi-
larly, many of the so-called economic due process and equal protection cases of the 1970s really
involved unsuccessful attempts to give protection to new types of suspect classes and fundamental
rights that a changing society viewed as increasingly significant. See Balkin, Federalism and the
Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. LAW. 459, 489-91 (1987).
reflect a profound dissatisfaction with the gradual stagnation of equal
protection doctrine. Moreover, as cases like these become less and less
exceptional, they announce the incipient rejection and transformation of
the two-tier system, a transformation that we are living through even
now.
The process of doctrinal ossification culminated in the 1973 decision
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,8 2 in which the
Court not only held that education was not a fundamental right but reit-
erated that poverty was not a suspect classification. With that decision
the Court seemingly closed off, for a time, the list of rights and classes
that would be counted as "footnote cases"-and would thus receive the
benefits of heightened judicial scrutiny. In Rodriguez, Justice Powell sur-
veyed the list of fundamental rights and decided arbitrarily that the
Court would accept no more of them. In support of this decision, he
announced that henceforth no right would be considered fundamental
unless it had been explicitly or implicitly recognized in the Constitu-
tion.83 This statement was itself an ossification of doctrine, a decision to
consolidate constitutional principles at a particular point in history. For
the right to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma s4 and the right to travel in
Shapiro v. Thompson8 5 were no more and no less implicated in the Con-
stitution than the right to education in Rodriguez. The only difference
was that the former rights had been mentioned in cases decided before
1973. All Powell could offer in justification of his ipse dixit was that
these rights had already been let in the door-and that the Court would
not compound that error by adding new rights. Thus, Rodriguez symbol-
ized not only a form of doctrinal stagnation, but, ironically, a new form
of exclusion-an attempt to place a hermetic seal on the logic of footnote
four, to prevent the accelerating conversion of text cases into footnote
cases.
As I have said, we cannot lay the blame for Dandridge and Rodri-
guez wholly upon Justice Stone. Yet there is a connection between the
division of text and footnote and the later problems of the 1970s, between
the paradigm of Carolene Products and the words of Justice Stewart in
Dandridge v. Williams:
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social regu-
lation as "overreaching" would be far too reminiscent of an era in which
the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down
state laws "because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 488. That era long ago passed into history.... To be sure, the
cases cited, and many others enunciating this fundamental standard under
82 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
83 Id. at 33-34.
84 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
85 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state regulation of
business or industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by
contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the
cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different
constitutional standard.... [I]t is a standard that is true to the principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to im-
pose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
policy.
86
How did this state of affairs come about? How was the progressive
vision of Justice Stone twisted into a heartless orthodoxy? How was rev-
olutionary politics stultified into conservative dogma, the religious fervor
of 1937 made pharisaic? The beginnings of the problem of the 1970s may
be found in the articulation and division in footnote four itself, an articu-
lation originally designed to remove obstacles in the path of progressive
economic and social policies. Yet within this strategy lay the possibility
of its own emasculation and deradicalization.
To understand this, one must recall the haphazard way in which
even the most progressive Supreme Court of the century dealt with the
problem of poverty. Many of the leading suspect class and fundamental
rights cases of the late Warren and early Burger Courts were really deci-
sions designed to protect the rights of the poor or the economically pow-
erless. Certainly this is true of leading cases like Boddie v. Connecticut,87
Shapiro v. Thompson,88 and Graham v. Richardson,89 at least before a
more conservative Court gradually sapped them of their transformative
force.90 Yet, at the same time, the Warren and Burger Courts refused to
accept poverty as a suspect classification, or promise judicial scrutiny
where differential levels of economic power were implicated per se.
The resulting doctrinal schizophrenia is too easily explained as the
Warren Court's uncompleted progressive agenda rudely truncated by the
Burger Court. It reflected a deeper ambivalence. During the 1960s and
1970s the Court clearly sensed the powerlessness of the poor, but was
unable or unwilling fully to accept the claim that the democratic process
treated lower income classes unfairly in general. Instead, the Court
picked out fundamental rights whose abridgement affected the poor in
significant respects, or else relied upon suspect classes that were, in some
contexts, proxies for poverty. This is not to say that these suspect classes
(race, national origin, gender, alienage, illegitimacy) and these funda-
mental rights (access to courts, right to travel) were not important and
deserving of protection in their own right. Still, the issue of economic
86 397 U.S. at 484-86 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
87 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
88 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
89 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding unconstitutional denial of welfare benefits to aliens).
90 See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (creating due process protections for recipi-
ents of welfare benefits).
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inequality hung around them like an unwelcome relative (a poor relation)
whom one does not have the heart to expel but who is certainly not going
to receive a permanent invitation to stay.
Hence, in all of the fundamental rights and suspect class cases of the
1960s and 1970s, the issue of economic power was both acknowledged
and unacknowledged. The Court was willing to remedy the ineffective-
ness of the political process to aid the poor in every way except directly.
And in so doing, the Court created rationales for heightened judicial
scrutiny that were so awkwardly constructed, so piecemeal, that they
created sympathy for Powell's skeptical conclusion in Rodriguez that it
was time to stop picking out fundamental rights and suspect classes at
random, that it was time to bar the door.
The source of the deep-rooted ambivalence that ultimately led to
Dandridge and Rodriguez is not the series of appointments made to the
Court between 1937 and 1971, although that undoubtedly had some im-
pact. The source of the problem is in the ideology of democratic plural-
ism reflected in the intellectual framework of Carolene Products-in
footnote four and the text, "Third," that surrounds it. Within Justice
Stone's list of the causes of failures of democratic process, no mention is
made of what seems today to be the most obvious cause of all-dispari-
ties in political power caused by differences in economic power. In 1938,
Stone saw unreasoning prejudice, censorship, and limited access to the
ballot box as the chief factors adulterating the purity of self-rule, and
given the experiences of his day, these assumptions cannot be too much
faulted. Yet fifty years of history would prove this viewpoint seriously
inadequate. Today, in a country where traditional civil liberties are rela-
tively well protected, we can see that disparities in wealth and economic
power may poison the democratic process every bit as much as the im-
perfections Stone identified in his famous footnote.
Footnote four's blindness to these impurities is not accidental-it is
inherent in its logical structure. The importance of this logic consists less
in what footnote four says than in what it does not say. In the second
paragraph of footnote four, when Stone decries "legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation," he does not consider the possibil-
ity that relative economic strength also affects the possibility of subse-
quent repeal. Nor does he imagine that governmental action that creates
or reinforces disparities in economic wealth and power might have exactly
the same self-sustaining effect as governmental action that more directly
affects political rights of speech and suffrage. To use the famous example
of Williamson v. Lee Optical,91 if opthamologists and optometrists use
draconian regulations to drive opticians out of business, it is hardly likely
that the latter group's weakened economic condition will enhance their
91 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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political effectiveness in a subsequent battle for repeal. Moreover, as pro-
ponents of campaign finance laws have argued for years, freedom of
speech means little if no one can hear you, either because you lack the
money to make yourself heard effectively or because your opponents
have drowned out your message by means of their superior resources.
Similarly, in paragraph three of footnote four, Stone speaks of "prej-
udice against discrete and insular minorities [as] a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." This implies that mi-
norities are closed out of the process because others will not deal with
them in the political arena. Yet paragraph three does not consider that
the true cause of political powerlessness of minorities might be disparities
in economic status which are the effects of previous prejudice or previous
exclusions from the political process. By focusing on pluralist bargaining
strategies, paragraph three captures the important insight that majorities
can adopt self-reproducing strategies for retaining power. Yet at the
same time, paragraph three declines to push the analysis of self-reproduc-
tion of status and power back one step further-it does not contemplate
that dominant economic and social forces might combine to perpetuate
an economic underclass, or create minority subcultures that feature pov-
erty, lack of education, learned helplessness, and self-destructive
behavior.
If the footnote is blind to these possibilities, it is because it defines
itself in terms of a text (the body of the opinion) which thrives upon that
blindness. For the argument of "Third" depends upon the assumption
that differences in wealth or economic power cannot by themselves be
possible causes of failures of the political process, cannot result in self-
reproducing stratifications of political power. This assumption was in
turn necessitated by Carolene Products' peculiar interpretation of West
Coast Hotel and the particular blindness of the Lochner era.
From the failures of the Lochner era, Carolene Products gleaned two
important and interrelated lessons. The first lesson was that regulation
with redistributive consequences could be in the public interest in spite
of, and indeed because of, its redistributive effects. The second, which
appeared to follow from the first, was that the judiciary should no longer
concern itself with struggles over economic rights. If the faith of the
revolution of 1937 consisted precisely in the belief that the distribution of
wealth in society was none of its business (except in the case of a simple
taking), how could the Court concern itself with the effect of wealth in
other contexts-that is, with its effects on the democratic process? Thus,
once again we see how much the logic of footnote four depends upon the
logic of the opinion that surrounds it. The agnosticism of Stone, the faith
of "Third," was that a properly functioning political process would regu-
late the economy and redistribute wealth in the public interest-the
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Court would only remain concerned with the formal structures of the
political process (the subject of the footnote).
In divorcing the structure of procedure from the structure of the
economy, Carolene Products proclaimed the essential independence of
political from economic liberty, and political from economic equality.
That this, too, was the lesson of the Lochner era seemed the most obvious
reading of the revolution wrought by West Coast Hotel. Yet here again
everything depended upon the partiality of a particular reading and upon
its accompanying blindnesses. We have seen that an institutional reading
of West Coast Hotel misses its more radical, humanitarian aspects. For
by daring to label the common law regime of property and contract a
"subsidy for unconscionable employers, 92 West Coast Hotel affirmed the
connection between economic equality and substantive liberty, between
economic power and political right. If the legislature was right to alter
the economic status quo because that regime violated human liberty,
then the distribution of economic power in society had everything to do
with the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause. The lesson of
Lochner was that courts should not hinder legislatures from pursing
human rights through alteration of property rights; and that the state
was responsible for the reproduction of disparities in economic power
achieved through maintenance of the status quo.
By neglecting this possible interpretation of West Coast Hotel, by
understanding it as the strict separation of political and economic liberty
(conceived in noncommon-law terms), the pluralist faith of Carolene
Products reintroduced, at a new level, the very evil that West Coast Hotel
found in Lochner. If the Lochner court had seen differences in economic
status as natural and not seriously affecting human rights, so now
Carolene Products saw differences in political power stemming from dif-
ferences in economic power as prepolitical and not seriously threatening
the purity of the democratic process. Just as Lochner saw the right of
economic participation as unaffected by differences in wealth, so now
Carolene Products assumed that the rights of political participation were
unaffected by these differences. Indeed, the pluralist credo of Carolene
Products is hardly different than the famous Lochnerian credo of Cop-
page v. Kansas,93 with the notion of political liberty substituted for that
of liberty of contract:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties [partici-
pating in the political process] are not equally unhampered by circum-
stances. This applies to all [political bargains].... Indeed a little reflection
will show that wherever the right of private property and [political liberty]
co-exist, each party when [participating in the political process] is inevita-
bly more or less influenced by the question whether he has much property,
92 379 U.S. at 399.
93 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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or little, or none; for [the political bargain] is made to the very end that
each may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that
which he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that,
unless all things are held in common, some persons must have more prop-
erty than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold [polit-
ical liberty] and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights.94
Why was the abandonment of West Coast Hotel's more progressive
tendencies so easy for a Court that viewed itself as liberal and progres-
sive? Why was it content to exchange the wheat for the chaff? We must
remember that in West Coast Hotel, the Court believed that the Washing-
ton legislature had acted to protect the rights of the poor. The Court was
optimistic that the democratic process usually would recognize the need
to move towards egalitarian measures, if only the heavy hand of the fed-
eral judiciary were removed. In this sense, the paradigm of West Coast
Hotel gave the Court a false optimism; it led the -Court to believe that
there was something about the institution of democratic legislatures that
made them more likely to regulate the economy and redistribute wealth
in the public interest. Conversely, the Court assumed that the Lochner
Court's reactionary tendencies were inherent in the structure of an
unelected judiciary, even though the result in West Coast Hotel itself be-
lied this very assumption. Thus, from the perspective of a particular mo-
ment in history, the new liberal Roosevelt majority believed that
institutional and substantive concerns were tied together in a much more
permanent way than later historical experience would confirm. If the
assumption of a connection between institutions and values seems partic-
ularly naive today, we should remember that it is a mistake frequently
made. The Warren Court led many liberal thinkers to precisely the op-
posite institutional conclusions, and it was not until the rise of the Burger
Court that liberal commentators once again began to recognize the
ambivalent relationship between substantive and institutional
considerations.
The historical situation in which the Roosevelt Court acted led to its
institutional delusions, its value-free rhetoric of deference to democracy.
Yet by disregarding the effects of differences in economic power on the
proper functioning of the political process, the Carolene Products Court
betrayed the revolutionary ideas of West Coast Hotel. In the very act of
casting out Lochner, it depended upon Lochner-like premises. In its ex-
clusion of impurities from the democratic process, it left untouched the
strongest source of adulteration. The Carolene product of Carolene
Products is, and always has been, adulterated-an impure substance cre-
ated by a dual substitution: The replacement of the substantive interpre-
tation of West Coast Hotel by an institutional one, and the exchange of
94 Id. at 17 (substitutions in brackets).
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the theory of judicial review in "Second" for that in "Third." And even
as these substitutions are made, they are concealed behind a myth of
purity: An ideal legislature that has never sat, moved by artificial pur-
poses that were never expressed, in the service of an artificial public good
that has never existed.
VI. LAW AND LITERATURE
If there is a recurrent theme to our discussion of Carolene Products,
it is the exclusion that is never fully exclusive, the purity that remains
always slightly impure. We have seen the themes of purity and impurity,
inclusion and exclusion, so obviously the concern of the subject of this
opinion (the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce) follow us
doggedly as we investigate its more theoretical aspects (the protection of
civil liberties and the theory of judicial review). There is a peculiar irony
and self-commentary even in this. For lawyers do not generally think
that the metaphorical, figurative, or syntactical features of legal texts
should play any role in discussions of the meaning of these texts. Such
concerns are not only extraneous to good legal analysis, but indeed, may
tend to confuse the issue. Yet the more we profess our lack of interest in
the metaphorical, figurative, and syntactic features of the text, (as yet
another form of impurity to be excluded from legal analysis) the more
assuredly they return to trouble the logic of the opinion. Once again, our
ability to exclude and marginalize these elements is never complete; our
attempt at purifying legal discourse of its literary aspects (leaving only
reliable logic and fact) is always impure.
But surely, you will object, this conclusion follows only because I
have deliberately tortured the text of Carolene Products, deliberately
sought out its figurations and metaphors. In short, I have treated this
legal text as if it were a poem! Yet why should anyone treat this opinion
as a literary text, focusing on its plays on words, puns, and verbal as-
sociations? What are such matters doing in a law review article?
Does not this very question pose the issue of marginalization all over
again? Does it not depend upon a vision of legal writing defined in terms
of exclusion? Perhaps, only half jokingly, we should raise a Carolene
Products defense in response: We need special protection for these figural
aspects of the legal text, which are unlikely to be given due consideration
by the normal process of legal analysis. Prejudice against discrete and
insular metaphors may be a special condition which tends seriously to
curtail those scholarly processes ordinarily to be relied upon for intellec-
tual inquiry. (And yet-here I introduce a dangerous thought half whis-
pered-perhaps metaphors in legal texts are not discrete and insular,
something so easily excluded. Perhaps as Professor Ackerman tells us,
the groups most seriously discriminated against are diffuse and anony-
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mous groups hidden within the body politic itself.95 Perhaps legal analy-
sis is itself inescapably figural, metaphorical, even as it denies this.)
But let us return to the question at hand: Why should one make so
much of the literary characteristics we find in Carolene Products? Surely
they are accidental to the structure of the argument-to the real issues of
civil rights, judicial power and legislative discretion. These theoretical
issues just happened to arise in a case involving the exclusion of impure
milk from interstate commerce-they could have arisen in a case involv-
ing regulation of hours and wages, or even the manufacture of ball bear-
ings. Nor are the syntactic features of the opinion any less contingent:
the Court's discussion of minority rights could easily have been made in
the body of the opinion, rather than in a footnote. Why, then, pay atten-
tion to such contingencies, such unessential details?
These objections disregard, overlook, and exclude what literary
scholars term an economy, a lucky condensation of features in a given
text. A poem or an aphorism communicates effectively because of its
play upon words, because of its witty connection between expression and
intention. The literary critic does not turn up her nose at the happy
associations between surface features of discourse; she knows that the
connections of sound and style among the various elements of a poem are
rich sources of meaning. She knows as well that such meaning cannot
always be captured through a prose description of a poem's methods and
processes of signification. Nor does a politician eschew aphorisms when
they elucidate a point, and yet such aphorisms gain their persuasive force
from puns, rhymes, or other surface features of language.
We have indeed been fortunate to discover, in this opinion about the
exclusion of impure milk, a happy confluence of metaphors that aid us in
exposing the flaws and difficulties of the modern theory of judicial review
first articulated in Carolene Products. But this providence is merely a
symptom of a deeper logic at work in Stone's opinion, a logic that would
have doubtless manifested itself if Stone had chosen different words, or
even if we had used another post-1937 opinion instead. Even if we accept
the distinction between surface features of a text and its logic, we do not
shun those surface features if they condense the problematics of the text
in a provocative or imaginative way.
Thus my use of metaphor and figuration must be understood as a
shortcut to understanding the structures and tensions of logic in modern
constitutional jurisprudence, by exploiting the textual economies in a
particular legal opinion. If I had been given, not Carolene Products, but
Williamson v. Lee Optical, an opinion that depends upon the same plural-
ist conception of politics, I would have found the same difficulties, the
same troubling features, even though the words and metaphors used
would be different ones. Yet, I have no doubt, other surface features of
95 Ackerman, supra note 16, at 724.
83:275 (1989) The Footnote
that opinion would call attention to themselves and bring us to the same
conclusions about the limitations of post-1937 jurisprudence. 96 As Der-
rida explains, if we had chosen a different opinion, a different description,
"the effect would be the same, the only loss being a certain economic
condensation or accumulation, which has not gone unnoticed." 97
By celebrating the textuality of a legal text, we are, in Jonathan
Culler's phrase-"betting with words"-seeking to find a happy econ-
omy or condensation of meaning in the ways in which the text refers to
itself and to its metaphors and processes of signification. 98 For example,
in his famous essay, "Plato's Pharmacy," 99 Derrida focuses on the use of
the Greek word pharmakon (remedy) in Plato's Phaedrus. Derrida con-
cludes that it is a "lucky" word-it condenses much in its philological
derivations and its resemblances to other words, like the Greek words for
poison (also translated as pharmakon), magician, sorcerer, and wizard
(all translated aspharmakeus), and scapegoat (pharmakos). Thus armed,
Derrida gives us an elaborate critique of Plato's philosophical system.
Similarly, the words in the text of Carolene Products are also "lucky"
words. They possess a strange economy that is equally uncanny, that
96 In Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court allows a lobby of opthamologists
and optometrists to place serious restrictions on the practice of opticians. The rationale of the law is
that opticians need regulation to avoid injury to their customers' vision. Yet this case, which con-
cerns a regulation designed to help the public see more clearly, is also a case about blindness and
distorted vision. The restrictions on optical services (as a potentially deceptive trade practice) in-
volve their own deceptions, as raw political power disguises itself in the form of the public interest.
The optician may not fit lenses to glasses without a prescription, a requirement created by a previous
prescription by the legislature, which distorts the public's vision even as it attempts to protect it. At
the same time, the rational basis test requires the Court to blind itself to the political struggle behind
the statute, the victory of one lobby over another. In holding as it does, the Court assumes that it is
not responsible if the legislature cannot see what is really in the public interest, or even if the legisla-
ture deliberately chooses to deceive the public. Perhaps this is because, as the Court seems to sug-
gest, that there is no preexisting public interest to see in the first place.
Yet in the blindness of Williamson, all have trouble seeing-the Court as well as legislatures
and the public. In Williamson, a case about the protection of vision, we witness the virtual elimina-
tion of vision (scrutiny). Not only does Justice Douglas not scrutinize the statute closely, he deliber-
ately looks the other way. He refuses to see what is obvious on the face of the statute-that this
regulation was designed to favor opthamologists and optometrists over opticians, and in particular,
to curtail the growth of cut-rate volume optical services in department stores. (Today, of course, we
might look at some of the restrictions-those on advertising, for example-with different eyes.) The
rational basis test of Williamson is not a neutral act of judicial deference. It is a lens through which
one views the political process-rose colored glasses, if you will. It is a distortion of vision in which
the pluralist bargaining process is made to appear fair and not in need of judicial supervision. The
Due Process game envisioned in Williamson requires the Court to make up reasons to justify the
statute, to see things that aren't really there, or at least to view them in their best light. The Court,
faced with claims of naked redistribution, refuses to see the nakedness. It declines to correct the
legislature's shortsightedness. Its credo, in this and every other economic regulation case, is that the
majority rules-the eyes have it.
97 J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 220 (1981).
98 J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 146 (1982).
99 J. DERRIDA, Plato's Pharmacy, in DISSEMINATION 61 (1981).
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troubles the substantive argument of the opinion, unveils its hidden as-
sumptions, and silently rebukes it for its exclusions. Like Derrida, our
bet with words has indeed unearthed a useful condensation (and not only
of milk).
At the same time, there is another, equally important, and yet al-
most contradictory reason to be concerned with the surface features of
legal language. To neglect the economies of expression within a text is to
deny its writtenness, its textuality, its text-ture. Disregarding the contin-
gent or surface features of legal language features is symptomatic of the
very issue of marginalization, exclusion, and false preservation of purity
that we have noted before. We believe that we preserve the real, pure
meaning of the text we call Carolene Products by excluding superficial,
contingent features of the text. We believe that we thus purify it, claim-
ing that the same ideas could have been stated another way, unlike a
poem, which resists paraphrase. Yet in so doing, we deliberately place
blinders on the ways in which textuality (metaphor, expression, and so
forth) affect our ways of thinking about legal problems.100
Does this mean that the lawyer should become a literary critic?
Note the use of the word "become"-as if the lawyer were not one al-
ready. Has no one noticed that recent commentaries on Carolene Prod-
ucts are already brilliant examples of textual criticism? I am thinking, in
particular, of the contributions of Professors Brilmayer and Acker-
man.101 Professor Ackerman shows us that Stone's famous metaphor
"discrete and insular minorities" misleads us about the ways in which the
political process fails us. By demonstrating that diffuseness and anonym-
ity can as easily lead to underrepresentation, Ackerman reveals the parti-
ality and incompleteness of Stone's original language.102 Professor
Brilmayer explains how the logic of Carolene Products, pursued to its
conclusion, defeats its assumption that the political process adequately
represents minorities except where legislation directly discriminates
against them. She argues convincingly that the impurity in the process
caused by underrepresentation cannot be cabined in, that it infects even
neutral statutes. She concludes that the value-free rhetoric of representa-
tion in Carolene Products undermines itself, ultimately revealing its
100 As Justice Cardozo warned us long ago: "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often in enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.,
244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). Yet Cardozo's admonition does not go far enough. It does
not warn us that our language is already and always inescapably metaphorical and figural; that a
logically pure language, divorced from metaphor, has never existed. Moreover, our attempts at
excluding metaphor result in a dual impurity-first, because the figural can never be completely
banished from discourse, only neglected or overlooked, and second, because any claim that legal
thought can rest upon a wholly nonmetaphorical ground involves its own adulteration and
deception.
101 Brilmayer, supra note 16; Ackerman, supra note 16.
102 Ackerman, supra note 16, at 724-31.
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value-laden content.10 3
Are Professors Ackerman and Brilmayer legal critics or literary crit-
ics? Why ask such a question? Can we not admit that they are simply
critics, or if one must have an introductory adjective, textual critics?
They too, rely upon the processes of signification in this text (which we
call an "opinion"). They too, are equally interested in the problematics
of its language, except that at first glance they appear to investigate only
a particular aspect of that problematics that we are used to hearing about
in a particular academic context. Yet the problems of signification that
we see as essentially "legal" in nature (whether such and such is a good
distinction, a sound argument, a good description of the relevant facts),
are affected by the writer's choice of language, and more importantly, by
those linguistic and cultural factors that she did not choose, but were
chosen for her. Is it not clear that the difficulties Ackerman locates in
the ideology of Carolene Products are reflected in the choice of an adven-
titious metaphor? Is it not obvious that the logical flaws Brilmayer un-
earths find their source in the rhetoric of value neutrality and pluralist
democracy?
Perhaps you are impatient with this line of reasoning, this decon-
structive dancing around the point. You reiterate your objection as fol-
lows: "Look here. I am reading a law review article in a law review.
What you are suggesting does not fit the format of good legal analysis, it
is not appropriate, it does not fit within an acceptable framework." Yet
why is it impossible for legal analysis to look further than the cut and
slash of logical argument? Why do we believe that logical argument is
hermetically sealed off from the vagaries of language-from the subtle
but insidious influence of surface characteristics of language, such as
metaphor, rhyming, etymological and phonic similarity? Derrida argues
that this is the very mistake that philosophers make in their insistence
that philosophy is not simply another form of writing, that it can be
shorn of its metaphorical baggage.
Why could a system of legal argument not rely on literary features
of language, on puns and plays on words? Consider the Rabbis of the
Talmud and the Midrash, for example. They saw their task as infinitely
more important than merely the development of a system of secular regu-
lation-for they were expounding the Divine law as received in the To-
rah. Yet in interpreting the Holy Scriptures they had no scruples about
making a clever play on words or even misreading or mispronouncing a
word in order to make a legal or ethical point. They well understood
that such aphorisms effected an economy, or condensation, that was
available in the text and could be exploited for the purpose of under-
standing the text. These same Rabbis made much of mistakes and errors
in spelling and grammar in the Torah. Far from regarding mistakes as
103 Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 1330-34.
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surface characteristics of a legal text to be disregarded, they assumed
instead that no such mistakes existed without a hermeneutical purpose.
Hence, they devised elaborate explanations for why errors were placed in
the text, even making use of numerology in order to explain their deeper
meanings. And such arguments were accepted not because they con-
vinced logically, but because they revealed important facets of the text
not discoverable through logic alone.
If we reject such wordplay and argumentation in our own legal
texts, is this because we are so much wiser than the Rabbis of the Talmud
and the Midrash, so much more advanced in our legal reasoning
processes, or is it because of our cultural background, our self-imposed
blinders and limitations, our decision to seal off the legal from the liter-
ary? We assume, without argument (based, one might think, on political
and social factors of modem Western life) that good "legal" or "philo-
sophical" reasoning cannot be the same as good literary analysis, that the
textual analysis involved in one case is not the same textual analysis in-
volved in the other. We assume, again without argument, that the
problematics of texts must be divided up into those problematics that are
suitable for lawyers to investigate (how well the argument is constructed,
its reliance on logic and facts) and those that are suitable for the literary
critic. Yet the division of these problematics is itself problematical.
Perhaps you will concede that if Carolene Products had been a reli-
gious document, or a Talmudic text, the type of analysis I have presented
here might seem more acceptable. Yet, you may say, Carolene Products
is not a religious text, and therefore this type of analysis is inappropriate.
But this argument reveals its own cultural dependencies, its own nonlogi-
cal basis, the moment it is stated. It demonstrates that proper textual
analysis (even for legal texts like the Torah) depends upon context, upon
history, upon a tradition of hermeneutical practices, and is therefore not
simply given, not simply immanent in the text itself. Anglo-American
lawyers, and, I dare say, Western lawyers in general, have isolated a
number of modes of dealing with texts, called them proper legal analysis,
and discarded all other approaches. You may say that is because these
modes of analysis deal with the intention or logic of the writer's argu-
ment. And I respond that the intention of the author, or the reasoning of
her argument, is often irrelevant to legal analysis in the West, because we
often read texts in ways contrary to the intention or the reasoning of the
persons who created them. What we call legal analysis or the logical
analysis of a text, then, is simply the creation of a specific hermeneutical
tradition of reading and rereading. And it is the height of arrogance for
us to claim that a text can teach us no more than what we can glean from
it using the limited tools that constitute Western Legal Analysis.
I must note here parenthetically that one of Plato's great achieve-
ments was his struggle to create a separate discipline of philosophy, one
that divorced philosophical argument from the figural language of the
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poets and the wordplay of the Sophists. Thus, in the Euthydemus, he has
Socrates confront and defeat two brothers, who are known as eristics, or
"fighters with words," and who routinely use puns in an effort to trip up
their opponents.' 4 The brothers' practice seems so odd to us, who work
in Plato's shadow, that we cannot understand why anyone ever thought
their arguments convincing. This more than anything else demonstrates
the extent of Plato's victory in establishing a paradigm of philosophical
argument. But in his great philosophical achievements, has Plato saved
us from error, or has he merely intervened in the linguistic field by divid-
ing the world into philosophical discourse, which is literary without
knowing it, and literary discourse, which is self-consciously literary?
Viewed in this light, it is no accident that Plato distrusted poetry,
for poetry posed the greatest threat to a self-contained discipline of phi-
losophy. Plato was suspicious of poets both for their capacity to per-
suade people through non-philosophical means and for their capacity to
lead people astray. Yet poets could both persuade and mislead precisely
because they reveled in the ungainliness, the irrepressibility of language,
while philosophers viewed language only as an unfortunate necessity, a
wild beast that needed to be tamed. For the poet, the blessing of lan-
guage was its infinite equivocality, its rich evocativeness. For the philos-
opher (and today for the lawyer) the curse of language was its opacity-
for ideally, language should be transparent to reason.
In this essay, I have attempted to question the unspoken assump-
tions we make in reading legal texts. I have taken seriously the decon-
structive claim that a text, even a legal text, may contain an economy: a
savings, condensation, or husbanding of resources. I have noted some of
the many economies at work in Carolene Products: the ability of this text
to say many different and often contradictory things on many different
levels at the same time, depending upon our focus. For my part, I do not
think that we should turn up our noses to such economies, as one does to
a bottle of spoiled milk. Rather, we should exploit these economies, ex-
amine the processes of signification in legal texts more closely, in the
hope that we can understand the unconscious and unarticulated ways in
which we create our world through our use of language. We should, in
short, become rhetorical or literary economists-studying the ways in
which our language conveys more than is meant, in which our language
traps us, and in which our language talks about itself, reinforcing or con-
tradicting what it says.
It is appropriate that there should be an economy in Carolene Prod-
ucts, a case about the regulation of the economy, and that this economy
should remain unregulated, that is, without boundaries, uncanny and un-
containable. The opinion, which concerns the need for economic regula-
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tion, itself demonstrates the unregulatability of the economy of a text.
For what is orthodox legal analysis but an attempt to regulate this econ-
omy-to delimit a certain set of features about a text that are appropriate
for the reader to consider? Yet the very act of regulating the economies
of a text robs the text of its richness (thus destroying its economy) and at
the same time guarantees that its economies of expression will be on the
outside, (like businesses that move away from a heavily regulated state)
peering in and mocking the utopia that the regulator has sought to cre-
ate. Shall we accept this regulation as the only possible regime, or shall
we dare to reap the hidden economies of our legal texts? The texts await
us, offering unbounded opportunities. We lack only the entrepreneurs. 4
4 [Note to the editors of the Law Review-place the entire text of this Article (including this
footnote with these instructions) in this footnote. If this causes a problem of infinite regress,
improvise].
